A recent issue of the Philosophers' Magazine included a special section on experimental philosophy. Just as you might expect, there were separate articles on the various different topics that experimental philosophers have investigated (consciousness, intentional action, gender, moral relativism). But then, the editors thought there should also be an article on the very idea of experimental philosophy and the controversy that this idea has engendered. To write this article, they commissioned Tamler Sommers.
As Sommers explains in the text of his published piece, he had an incredibly difficult time trying to muster up anything interesting to say on the topic.
I couldn’t do it. I could not get myself to write an essay about the general debate over experimental philosophy. At the time, I had no idea why it was so difficult, but I think I do now. Debates are interesting when there is more than one reasonable position to hold. A debate about whether a particular instance of hate speech should be protected by federal law might be interesting. A debate about the value of freedom of expression laws in general is not. On the question of the general value or viability of experimental philosophy, there is only one reasonable position. This makes it an exceptionally boring debate...
Ultimately, the conclusion Sommers reaches is that the only interesting questions here are about the individual topics that experimental philosophers discuss (consciousness, intentional action, and all the rest). There is just no philosophically interesting issue about whether experimental philosophy itself is a worthwhile field.
Thoughts?
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