Readers may be interested in this new paper by David Chalmers responding to Herman Cappelen's argument in Philosophy Without Intuitions that contemporary analytic philosophers don't rely on intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories.
Prereflectively at least, it might have seemed really obvious that philosophers do rely on intuitions. So it had been suggested previously that one simple way to challenge Cappelen's argument would be to defend a specialized theory of intuition. But part of Chalmers' argument here is that there is a minimal way to understand the notion and subsequent use of intuition that both does justice to the way philosophers typically use the term, as well as vindicates this general sense in which it may have seemed so obvious that philosophers do rely on intuitions.
The minimal sense involves characterizing intuitive claims as claims with broadly non-inferential justification (or simply, justification that does not derive from "inferential, perceptual, introspective, memorial, or testimonial justification"). Then, and with respect to their use, Chalmers emphasises their dialectical justiﬁcatory status, or the use of intuitions in how a subject supports a claim to someone else. Putting all this together, "What is distinctive about appeals to intuition" Chalmers writes, "is that intuitive claims are taken to have a dialectical justiﬁcation that is broadly noninferential. That is, they are taken to be dialectically justiﬁed (for all parties) in a way that does not depend on an inferential, perceptual, memorial, introspective, or testimonial dialectical justiﬁcation".
So is this minimal sense reflective of the typical philosophical self-conception, in a way that perhaps made the original claim about intuitions seem so plausible? If so, it really seems like the minimal sense would also open intuitions to several of the kinds of worries that experimental philosophers have been raising...