Yet another interesting and illuminating interview by 3:AM's Richard Marshall. This time, Al Mele talks about free will, self-deception, neuroscience, experimental philosophy and a number of other themes. Check it out!
And also, in Does the S&M Robot Feel Guilty? Mark Phelan, Justin Sytsma and I, continue our earlier discussion (from this blog) on valence, function, and the folk dichotomy of phenomenal states. Justin has provided some new experimental data on this topic since then that people interested in this question will want to check out.
Comments are open Feb 17-March 2, so be sure to head on over to OC4 and join in!
Daniel Cohnitz asked me to pass along the following:
Videos of the 2010 "Gottlob Frege Lectures in Theoretical Philosophy", delivered by Stephen Stich (Rutgers) on "Experimental Philosophy and the Bankruptcy of 'The Great Tradition'" are now online. You'll find them on the Frege Lectures website
There is an interesting and illuminating talk posted on Big Think by our
own Al Mele. In addition to talking about free will and weakness of will, he also talks about experimental philosophy. So, you should drop by to check it out!
She discusses nearly every chapter in the collection by Knobe and Nichols, Experimental Philosophy, and ultimately argues that:
the results of the most methodologically sound and philosophically relevant studies discussed in this volume could have been obtained from the armchair, and thus that experimental philosophy may not present a serious challenge to the traditional methods of analytic philosophy. (p. 761)
However, I think this statement of her conclusion is a bit misleading. Sometimes she does, as this quote indicates, simply want to reject the revisionist claim that x-phi should replace the armchair entirely (or pretty much entirely). But at other times she seems to be targeting the more modest claim that x-phi is a more promising methodology for some projects in philosophy. For example, she says "it seems that traditional analytic methods may well suffice for identifying the judgements that provide the right sorts of data for philosophical theories" (p. 767). Here she's not just saying x-phi doesn't undermine the armchair entirely; she's suggesting the armchair is as good as x-phi at gathering the relevant information about our concepts and so on.
Anywho, I thought readers of this blog might like to take a look at her piece if they haven't already.
Thanks to all the folks who sent me a link to Frank Jackson's recent NDPR review of the recent Experimental Philosophy anthology that was edited by Knobe and Nichols (a link to this volume can be found in the sidebar to the left). A quick google search also turned up this video of a recent talk by Jackson at Swarthmore entitled "Conceptual Analysis and Experimental Philosophy." I suspect this is a version of the talk he gave at the ANU conference on X-phi back in 2007.