Although work in the experimental philosophy of consciousness has investigated a number of intriguing questions, much of this work has been concerned in one way or another with the importance of the body.
Most of the studies in this tradition make use of the same sort of method. Participants are asked to consider an entity that does not have a biological body (a robot, a corporation, God). Participants are then given a series of questions about this entity's psychological states. Does it know that 2 + 2 = 4? Can it plan for the future? Can it feel happy? Such studies appear to be pointing to a surprising conclusion. It looks like people think that disembodied entites can have psychological states of various sorts but that they cannot have states that require phenomenal consciousness. (See this post for a quick summary.)
But now suppose we go in the opposite direction. Suppose we find an entity that is even more saliently embodied than you or I. What sorts of psychological states might people ascribe to an entity like that?