I am pleased to announce this call-for-papers for the first annual Philosophers' Cocoon Philosophy Conference (PCPC), which will be held at the University of Tampa from Friday October 18th-Sunday October 20th, 2013. This conference will be unique in several respects:
To submit a paper to present at the PCPC, please email the following to firstname.lastname@example.org by July 1, 2013: (1) a blinded (i.e. anonymized) paper, (2) a separate title page with the author's name, contract information, and brief paper abstract, and (3) a statement concerning whether you intend to attend the conference in person or only via Skype. Decision emails indicating whether your paper has been accepted will be sent out around August 1, 2013. Finally, please bear the following in mind:
In addition, Jason Stanley (coauthor of an experimental philosophy paper on knowledge) was hired at Yale, and psychologist Steve Guglielmo (coauthor of a number of experimental philosophy papers on intentional action) was hired at Macalester.
These people have really done some fantastic work, and their successes are very well deserved. A huge congratulations to them all!
p.s. I'm sure that I am missing some people here, so if you know of anyone else, please let me know. (Seriously, don't be needlessly humble: if I have forgotten to mention you, be sure to send me an email.)
p.p.s. If you are curious about the experimental philosophers hired last year, check out last year's post.
Congratulations to our own Professor Cristina Bicchieri on the recently launched Behavioral Ethics Lab (BeLab) at The University of Pennsylvania. Here is a description of the exciting project:
BeLab is part of the Philosophy, Politics and Economics Program and reflects its multidisciplinary spirit. We study moral behavior in all its complexity, so that our research crosses the boundaries of several disciplines. Our group includes psychologists, behavioral economists, game theorists, biologists, and moral and political philosophers. At BeLab we do laboratory experiments, but we also go to the field, and we theorize about what we find empirically, using analytical models as well as simulations.
I look forward to seeing the findings from their lab!
Has anyone done any experimental work that is relevant to how people think about agreement and disagreement?
A colleague is interested in whether there is a single folk concept of agreement and disagreement, whether people recognise distinct varieties of disagreement, etc. The interest concerns disagreement and agreement generally, not just moral disagreement.
Suggestions and comments gratefully received.
Synthese has just published the special issue edited by Stephan Hartmann, Chiara Lisciandra, and myself on "Formal epistemology meets experimental philosophy." It's accessible there.
In this issue, we bring together the two most active and innovative areas of philosophy in the last decade: formal epistemology and experimental philosophy. The articles we have edited show how much there is to gain by bringing the two approaches together.
From our editorial: "In the past few years, there has been an increasing tendency in the application of formal and experimental methods to tackle philosophical issues. We very much approve of this trend, which we view as part and parcel of the recent renewal of “scientific philosophy”: In our mind, the aim of a scientifically oriented philosophy is to adopt formal and experimental methods to address philosophical questions."
Most of you are familar with the side-effect effect (a.k.a., the Knobe Effect), which is the asymmetric attributions of intentionality (among other things) to agents based on the side-effect of their actions. Joshua Knobe originally discovered the affect by presenting people with a vignette in which a corporate chairman initiates a new program to increase profits which also harms or helps the environment. While the side-effect effect has been studied and expanded in a number of subsequent articles, I have long been surprised that there was almost no work done on the effect in relation to business ethics. Knobe's original vignette (and many subsequent versions) was set in a business context, and one side effect was morally permissible while the other was not.
In a new article in the Journal of Business Ethics, Paul Stey, Mark Alfano, and I examine the implications ofthe side-effect effect for business ethics, but with a twists. We wanted to know what role attributions of virtue and vice played as well. As it turns out, while attributions of the virtue of compassion and the vice of callousness don't exhibit the side-effect effect, they do mediate people's willingness to cease doing business with a company, even if it cost more.