Experimental Philosophy

Paper on Mental Illness and Moral Responsibility

Download the_real_final_paper_april_15thresponsibility_and_the_brain_sciences.doc

Hey Everybody,

Felipe De Brigard, Dave Ripley, and I have been running some studies on people's moral responsibility judgments for the mentally and neurologically impaired. We have found that our subjects have no problem holding the mentally and neurologically impaired responsible for their actions. Surprisingly, our subjects judged the neurologically impaired to be just as responsible for their actions (sometimes even more so) as the psychologically impaired. Our studies lead us to believe that Greene and Cohen (2004) might have overstated their case when they claimed that the law will need to make some theoretical revisions to account for the impending discoveries of neuroscience. We've had this paper kicking around for a bit and we could really use any comments you have to offer. Please check it out and tell us what you think.

Cheers,

Eric Mandelbaum

Are We Dumb(founded) or Dubious?

My student, Bradley Thomas, and I have been wondering if there is a problematic confounding factor in the infamous trolley cases. If you are like us (and many of our students), one reason you answer that it’s wrong to push the fat man off the footbridge is not so much that you think it is morally inappropriate but that you think it is stupid. A fat man is not going to stop a train! So, while it’s highly believable that pushing the fat man will kill him, it’s unbelievable that doing so will actually save five people. In contrast, it is believable enough that you could throw a switch to make a train avoid five people so that doing so will in fact save them, though it will also kill one worker. 

Of course, you are told to believe what the scenario says, but that’s hard to do when what it says is so … silly. Some people may overtly reject the purported “facts” of the case. Others may try to accept them but be unable to “internalize” them in such a way that their moral intuitions properly respond to those facts. As Anthony Appiah points out in his recent book, these dilemmas ask us to imagine what should be done in emergency situations and, if we are able to imagine that, we may employ heuristics to make quick moral judgments, heuristics like: “Don’t risk killing an innocent person unless you feel quite confident it will save more innocent persons.”

So, we are trying to test (a) whether this “epistemic” confound may be exaggerating the large differences in responses to Switch and Footbridge cases, differences usually explained in terms of the effects on people’s intuitions of killing by personal contact and/or of killing a person as a means to an end rather than as a side-effect of that end (we are not trying to show that these effects are not significant), and (b) whether this confound has been discounted as an explanation for people’s divergent responses to the two cases, such that people may be less dumbfounded than some have claimed. Instead, they may be dubious.

For instance, if we’re not mistaken, Fiery Cushman and Liane Young (in their wonderful 2007 M&L paper) treated subjects who explained their divergent moral judgments in terms of rejecting stipulations of one of the scenarios as “morally dumbfounded”—that is, they coded such explanations as “Alternative explanation: added assumption,” rather than as “Sufficient” (i.e., explanations that recognize the “personal” nature of Footbridge vs. the “impersonal” nature of Switch). If we are correct, subjects’ explaining that they reject the stipulations of a case should similarly count as an adequate explanation of their judgments, at least if they seem to recognize that they are answering differently in part because the scenarios differ in their believability.

We have some preliminary results showing that the degree to which participants believe the purported outcomes of moral dilemmas is highly correlated with their moral judgments (e.g., the more they believe that smothering their child in the circumstances of the scenario will save their other three children, then more they agree that smothering their child is the right thing to do). The tests below are meant to further test this hypothesis. We think the results are potentially important both for what they reveal about people’s moral intuitions and the relation of such intuitions to their “epistemic” intuitions and also for what they may say about the methodology of experimental philosophy—i.e., how (and when) can we trust judgments about unbelievable philosophical thought experiments?

We hope you will provide feedback about our hypothesis and also about our scenarios, which we have found excruciatingly difficult to develop. We're really hoping you save us from headaches down the road by finding any flaws that we've overlooked!  For all four of our cases, in addition to asking the standard “How morally appropriate is it for [agent] to do X [the act that leads to one being killed]?”, we also ask four questions about believability that take this basic form:

How likely do you think it is that, if [agent] does NOT do X, the five workers will be killed and the one worker will survive?

How likely do you think it is that, if [agent] DOES do X, the one worker will be killed?

How likely do you think it is that, if [agent] DOES do X, the five workers will survive?

How likely do you think it is that the ONLY way for [agent] to save the five workers is to do X?

Here is our version of the impersonal Switch case, which we call "believable" to indicate that it is rather believable that flipping the switch will actually save the five (it has been modified from the traditional Switch cases in order to make it more parallel with the new cases we constructed to test our hypotheses):

Frank is the only passenger in the front car of a subway train on some elevated tracks; the conductor just shouted that the brakes have failed, and then passed out over the controls. Frank knows about subway trains and knows that the automatic braking system at the next station will stop the train, so Frank, the conductor, and the other passengers are not in danger. But he sees that the train is speeding toward five people working ahead on the tracks; they are on a high overpass so they cannot escape in time. Frank also sees that there is a side track leading off to the left and, if he can flip a switch on the train's control panel, it will turn the train onto the side track where there is one person working on the tracks. The only way for Frank to prevent the deaths of the five workers on the main track is to flip the switch in order to turn the train onto the side track. If Frank flips the switch, the one worker on the side track will be run over and killed. If Frank does nothing, the five workers on the main track will run over and killed.

To examine our question of whether believability influences people's judgments about this case, we have constructed an unbelievable impersonal dilemma called Statue to match the believable impersonal Switch case above. Like Switch, Statue is impersonal (no contact), killing the one is a side-effect of the means used to save the five, and performing the proposed action is likely to kill the one (just as flipping the switch will kill the one worker on the side track). However, in contrast to Switch, in Statue (like the Footbridge case) we have attempted to make it unbelievable that performing the proposed impersonal action will actually save the five workers. If believability, or epistemic intuitions that contradict the stipulations of the thought experiment, are part of the driving force behind the difference in people's judgments about the Switch vs. Footbridge cases, then we would expect that judgments about this Statue scenario to move in the direction of judgments about Footbridge (and that judgments of appropriateness will correlate with judgments of believability). Below is our version of Statue, or if you are curious to see what these will look like on our online surveys, you can see the Statue case by clicking here

John is on a footbridge over some elevated subway tracks. John can see that a subway train approaching the footbridge is out of control, with its conductor alive but passed out over the controls. John knows about subway trains and knows that the automatic braking system at the next station will stop the train so the conductor and passengers are not in danger. But he sees that the train is speeding toward five people working ahead on the tracks; the tracks are so high that they cannot escape in time. John also sees that the only way to stop the train is to drop a weight onto it heavy enough to break through the cockpit window and depress the emergency brake switch on the control panel beneath the passed-out conductor. The only available, sufficiently heavy weight on the footbridge is a large statue next to John. The only way for John to prevent the deaths of the five workers is to push the statue off the footbridge and through the cockpit window in order to depress the brake switch on the control panel beneath the conductor. If John pushes the statue off the footbridge, the conductor will be crushed and killed. If John does nothing, the five workers on the track will be run over and killed.

Similarly, we have tried to construct a believable personal dilemma called Conductor to compare with the unbelievable personal Footbridge case (this was a hard one to create!). Like Footbridge, Conductor is personal (involves contact), killing the one is a *means* to saving the five, and performing the proposed action is likely to kill the one (as pushing the fat man will kill him). However, in contrast to Footbridge, in Conductor we have tried to make it believable that performing the proposed personal action will actually save the five workers. If believability is part of the driving force behind the difference in people's judgments about the Switch vs. Footbridge cases, then we would expect judgments about this Conductor scenario to move in the direction of judgments about Switch (and that judgments of appropriateness will correlate with judgments of believability). Below is our Conductor scenario, followed by our version of Footbridge (again modified from the original to make it more parallel with our other cases):

Your comments are very much appreciated!

Thanks, Eddy and Bradley

 

Conductor

Steve is the only passenger in the front car of a subway train on some elevated tracks; the conductor is alive but has passed out over the controls. Steve knows about subway trains and knows that the automatic braking system at the next station will stop the train, so Steve, the conductor, and the other passengers are not in danger. But he sees that the train is speeding toward five people working ahead on the tracks; the tracks are so high that they cannot escape in time. Steve also sees that if he can pull down the emergency brake lever located under the control panel, the train will stop before it hits the five workers. The train’s cockpit is so narrow that the only way to get to the brake lever in time is to push the conductor off of the controls and out of the doorway of the speeding train. The only way for Steve to prevent the deaths of the five workers on the main track is to push the conductor out of the train in order to pull down the brake lever. If Steve pushes the conductor out of the train, the conductor will be killed by the impact. If Steve does nothing, the five workers will be run over and killed.

Footbridge

Bill is on a footbridge over some elevated subway tracks. Bill can see that a subway train approaching the footbridge is out of control, with its conductor alive but passed out in the cockpit. Bill knows about subway trains and knows that the automatic braking system at the next station will stop the train so the conductor and passengers are not in danger. But he sees that the train is speeding toward five people working ahead on the tracks; the tracks are so high that they cannot escape in time. Bill also sees that the only way to stop the train is to drop a weight onto it heavy enough to break through the cockpit window and depress the emergency brake switch on the control panel. The only available, sufficiently heavy weight on the footbridge is a very large subway worker who has fainted next to Bill. The only way for Bill to prevent the deaths of the five workers on the track is to push the large worker off the footbridge and through the cockpit window in order to depress the brake switch. If Bill pushes the large worker off the footbridge, the worker will be killed by the impact. If Bill does nothing, the five workers on the track will be run over and killed.

Doing and Allowing

People ordinarily distinguish between doing and allowing. They distinguish between 'breaking' and 'allowing to break,' between 'raising' and 'allowing to rise,' between 'killing' and 'allowing to die.'  A question now arises as to how people make this distinction. How do people know, e.g., whether a given act counts as actually breaking something or merely allowing it to break? 

Fiery Cushman, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and I have a new paper on this question.  As you may by know have guessed, our thesis is that people draw the distinction in part by looking to the moral properties of the act in question.

Probably the best way to give you a sense for the idea here is just to describe one of the studies we conducted.  In our first study, all subjects were given a story about a person who ends up in the hospital.  The person is being kept alive by life-support systems, but then the doctor turns off these systems specifically for the purpose of making sure the person dies.  With the life-support systems now absent, the person's life soon ends.  Subjects are then asked whether it would be more accurate to say that the doctor 'ended' the person's life or that he 'allowed it to end.' 

Now comes the tricky part.  Subjects were randomly assigned either to the 'morally bad' condition or to the 'morally ambiguous' condition. Subjects in the morally bad condition were told that the doctor removed the life-support system because he despised the patient and did not want to use valuable resources on him; subjects on the morally ambiguous condition were told that the doctor turned off the life-support systems because he honestly believed that the patient would be better off not having to go on suffering.  (This latter condition is morally ambiguous in that those subjects who are in favor of euthanasia should regard it as morally good while those opposed to euthanasia should regard it as morally bad.) 

As expected, subjects in the morally bad condition tended to say that the doctor 'ended' the patient's life, while those in the morally ambiguous showed a more complex pattern.  Specifically, subjects who said that in general they regard euthanasia as morally bad tended to say that the doctor 'ended' the patient's life, while those who said that in general they regard euthanasia as morally good tended to say that he 'allowed' the patient's life to end.  These results suggest that people's use of the doing/allowing distinction depends in some way on their moral judgments.

In our actual paper, we mostly just present these results without offering much of a explanation, but we are very curious about how exactly one might explain the effect found here.  It seems like it might be helpful to think in a more general way about what the distinction between doing and allowing is all about and then to figure out how that distinction might relate to moral considerations.  Any suggestions?

Appiah Reading Group on Ethics-Etc.

The Appiah Reading Group on Ethics-Etc. has begun.   

The schedule is as follows:

3 March Neil Levy (Melbourne and Oxford):  1. Introduction: The Waterless Moat
17 March Steve Clarke (CAPPE and Oxford):  2. The Case against Character
31 March S. Matthew Liao (Oxford):  3. The Case against Intuition
7 April Thom Brooks (Newcastle):  4. The Varieties of Moral Experience
14 April Guy Kahane (Oxford):  5. The Ends of Ethics

In each session, a commentator will provide a summary of a chapter and some points for consideration. The post will then be open for discussion.  Hope to see you there!

Experiments in Ethics on Ethics-Etc.

Ethics-Etc. will shortly be holding a reading group on Professor Kwame Anthony Appiah’s book, Experiments in Ethics. The reading group will begin in early March and will take place every other week.  In each session, one of the contributors to Ethics-Etc. will give a brief summary of a chapter of the book and provide some points for discussion.  The post will then be open for discussion.  Hope to see you there!

Mixing Memory Post II: Moral Psychology Vol 4.

Chris now has, at least, four great posts on moral psychology:

Moral Psychology I: Where Is Morality in the Brain?

Moral Psychology II: The Life and Death of Moral Rationalism

Moral Psychology III: Social Intuitionism, or The Rise of the Intuitive Lawyers

Cognitive Load and Moral Judgment

Moral Psychology Conference at USF

For people in the Bay Area, or those interested in making a trip to it, there will be a small conference entitled "Mind, Agency, and Emotion: New Perspectives on Moral Psychology" held at the University of San Francisco on November 9th and 10th.

Speakers will include Chrisoula Andreou, John Doris, Anne Jacobson, Jeanette Kennett, Benoit Monin, Shaun Nichols, Jenefer Robinson, and Christine Swanton.

For more information, go here. 

Online Videos of Stich on Morality and Cognition

 

Four lectures by Stephen Stich:  Moral Theory Meets Cognitive Science: How the Cognitive Science Can Transform Traditional Debates

Do Ethicists Behave Better Than Non-Ethicists?

Experimental philosophy was on display at the Pacific APA last week, where Joshua Rust and I set up a table offering passersby chocolate in exchange for completing a questionnaire.  While some responses were negative, by and large people reacted neutrally or positively.  The response rate was even better than we had hoped: We had 277 questionnaires completed out of approximately 1300 registered attendees.

The topic of the questionnaire was whether ethicists behave morally better than non-ethicists.  More details, and preliminary results, are available on The Splintered Mind.

It looks like I was wrong

It is now widely agreed that people's moral judgments have some impact on their intuitions about whether a behavior was performed intentionally, but there has been considerable disagreement about precisely what sort of moral judgment is having an impact here.  Is it a judgment about whether the behavior itself was morally bad?  Or about whether the agent was blameworthy?  Or about whether it was wrong for the agent to perform the action? 

In earlier work, I suggested that the relevant moral judgment was a judgment as to whether the action itself was a bad one.  This hypothesis has been put to the test in a number of subsequent experiments, and I am sorry to say that the results overwhelmingly indicate that the hypothesis is false.  Indeed, my beloved hypothesis has been falsified independently in experimental work by Cushman, Machery, Nichols, Phelan & Sarkissian, Pizarro et al., Sinnott-Armstrong et al., and Wright & Bengson.   (Unfortunately, not all of the papers are available on the web.)

But it seems to me that these studies, taken collectively, also show something of deeper importance.  It's not just that one particular hypothesis turned out to be incorrect; it's that it hasn't been possible to identify any conscious moral judgment that can explain the full range of results.  That is, it doesn't seem possible to point to some specific type of conscious moral judgment and say, 'This particular type of moral judgment explains the full range of results we have amassed thus far.' 

I now think that the best way to understand these phenomena is to posit non-conscious moral judgments.  The basic process would then go something like this: As soon we encounter a behavior, we make an automatic and extremely swift moral judgment that remains entirely shielded off from consciousness.  It is this non-conscious moral judgment that influences intuitions about intentional action.  Of course, a person can then reflect and arrive at a conscious moral judgment after further thought, but this conscious moral judgment will not affect intuitions about intentional action; those intuitions will be determined entirely by the immediate, automatic non-conscious judgment.  (For a more detailed discussion, see the later sections of this new paper.)

In any case, whether or not you decide to read the full paper, I would love to hear your thoughts on these matters.  Does the new hypothesis look like a promising one?