Philosophy of Mind and Action
4th Workshop of the Experimental Philosophy
12-13 September 2013, Wills Memorial Building, University
for Submission: 5th July 2013
Experimental Philosophy Group UK
invites the submission of 500-word abstracts for 45-minute presentations or
poster presentations on ‘Experimental Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind and Action’
for their upcoming workshop. Keynote
presentations will be given by Natalie Gold (KCL), James Moore (Goldsmiths),
Regina Rini (Oxford) and Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside).
We welcome submissions presenting
recently completed experimental work, engaging with the work of any of this
year’s keynote speakers, proposing new experimental work, discussing existing
empirical studies in the fields of Philosophy of Mind and Action, introducing
novel approaches in this area or raising relevant methodological questions.
All high-quality submissions
considered. Submissions encouraged from all levels of academia. 500-word
abstracts to be sent as PDF or Word documents to
email@example.com by 5th July 2013. Subject line of email
should read “SUBMISSION [YOUR NAME]”. In the body of the email please state your
name, affiliation and in which category (presentation or poster) you wish your
submission to be considered. Submissions
for presentations that are unsuccessful will be automatically considered for
poster presentation. Presenters
should be prepared to obtain funding from their home department, or to fund
Fordham's Stephen Grimm asked me to post the following announcement:
Fordham recently received a 3.56 million dollar grant from the Templeton Foundation to help support a project called "Varieties of Understanding: New Perspectives from Psychology, Philosophy, and Theology." Funding opportunities in philosophy and psychology are available, and I'm trying to spread the word about that.
The website for the grant is here, and the Fordham press release is here.
Here's also a brief description:
Fordham's "Varieties of Understanding" Project
The Philosophy Department at Fordham University is pleased to announce its three-year “Varieties of Understanding” project.
The project will sponsor research in psychology, philosophy, and theology that will examine the various ways in which human beings understand the world, how these various types of understanding might be improved, and how they might be combined with one another to produce an integrated understanding of the world.
The project is supported by a 3.56 million dollar grant from the John Templeton Foundation, with additional support from the Henry Luce Foundation, Fordham University, and the University of California, Berkeley.
Thanks! And just let me know if you have any questions.
An International Conference on Epistemology,
Linguistic Diversity & Cultural Diversity
the heyday of ordinary language philosophy, epistemologists have devoted a
great deal of attention to the English word ‘know’ and to English sentences used to
attribute knowledge. When someone says
“S knows that p”, what does the word ‘knows’ mean? What concept does it express? How should that concept be analyzed? More recently, contextualists have argued
that the truth conditions for “S knows that p,” or the proposition it
expresses, varies depending on the context of the speaker. Invariantists have used sophisticated
linguistic arguments to challenge contextualism, and some of them, the
subject-sensitive invariantists who embrace the pragmatic encroachment thesis,
have gone on to claim that the truth conditions of ‘S knows that p’ are
sensitive to factors like how important the truth of p is to S. In all of this literature, hypothetical cases
play an important role. A situation is
described, almost always in English, and then philosophers judge whether it is
true that in that situation, S knows that p, or whether saying “S knows that p”
is false, or deviant, or intuitively unacceptable. With the emergence of experimental
philosophy, it has become increasingly common to present these scenarios to
ordinary English speakers, and ask them to judge whether it’s true that S knows
English is just one of over 6000 languages spoken around the world. Though it is the third most common language,
it is the native language of less than 6% of the world’s population. And
when Western epistemology first emerged, in ancient Greece, English did not
exist. So why should we think that facts
about the English word “know,” the concept it expresses, or subtle semantic
properties of “S knows that p” have important implications for
possible answer invokes what might be called the “universality thesis,” which
claims that the properties of the English word “know” and the English sentence ‘S
knows that p’ that have been studied by epistemologists are shared by the translations
of these expressions in most or all languages.
If the universality thesis is true, then the Chinese and Japanese and
Korean and Hindi translations of ‘know’ all express the same concept. So when we have a good account of the concept
expressed by the English verb ‘know’ we will have a good account of the concept of knowledge. And if it is established that contextualism
is true for ‘S knows that p,’ then contextualism is true for knowledge
attributions in most languages.
universality thesis turns out to be true, it will be a remarkable fact that
cries out for an explanation. But there
is currently very little reason to think that the universality thesis is true, since little or nothing is
known about the meaning and use of epistemic terms in languages other than English. What little is known looks to point in the
other direction. For example, in
Japanese there are two words used to translate ‘know’ in propositional
knowledge attributions, ‘Shitte-iru’ and ‘Wakatte-iru’, neither of which has
the same extension as ‘know’.
universality thesis is false, what are the implications for epistemology? Should epistemologists study knowledge
attributions in languages other than English with the same diligence they have
shown for the study of English knowledge attributions? If not, why not? Are the concepts expressed by ‘Shitte-iru,’
‘Wakatte-iru’ and the epistemic terms in other languages as important for
epistemology as the concept expressed by ‘know’? If not, why not? If pragmatic encroachment is true for knowledge
attributions in English but not for knowledge attributions in Korean, what, if
anything, does this tell us about the questions that philosophers interested in
epistemology have been asking since the Meno? Would findings like this support Allan
Hazlett’s provocative suggestion that epistemologists should “stop looking at
linguistic phenomena altogether?”
conference will be bringing together philosophers, linguists, psychologists and
social scientists from Asia and the West to discuss and debate both the
empirical and the philosophical questions raised by linguistic and cultural
diversity in the epistemic domain. Does
the available evidence suggest that the universality thesis is false? If so, in what ways do the concepts expressed
by ‘know’ and its counterparts in different languages differ? What do we know, and how can we learn more,
about the workings of knowledge attributions in languages quite different from
English? And what should philosophers
interested in epistemology make of all this?
strongly encourage participation by philosophers, linguists and psychologists
who are knowledgeable about the languages and cultures of non-Western
countries, and of Western philosophers who are interested in epistemology for
the rest of the world.
Submissions are invited on any topic pertaining to experimental philosophy. Authors will have approximately 40 min. presentation time. Authors can report new experimental results or contribute to broader philosophical or methodological debates over existing results.
Both XPhi-friendly and XPhi-critical papers are welcomed, although XPhi-critical authors may be asked to sit at the back of the room. Authors who choose to read their papers verbatim rather than talk through them will be served cold (but not iced) coffee.
Final Call for Abstracts: Intuitions, Experiments and Philosophy
3rd Workshop of the Experimental Philosophy Group UK, 8-9th September 2012, University of Nottingham
Deadline for Submission: 7th July 2012
Experimental Philosophy Group UK invites the submission of 500-word abstracts for 45-minute presentations or poster presentations on the subject of ‘Intuitions, Experiments and Philosophy’ for their upcoming workshop. Keynote presentations will be given by Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona) and Simone Schnall (University of Cambridge).
The following is a list of suggested types of content and possible topics:
Proposals for new experimental work
Presentations of new experimental work
The role/relevance of empirical findings in philosophy
The role/relevance of intuition in philosophy
The empirical investigation of intuitions
The nature of philosophical intuition
Philosophical implications of gender, cultural or other demographic difference in intuition
Methodological issues raised by experimental philosophy
All high-quality submissions considered. Submissions encouraged from all levels of academia. 500-word abstracts to be sent as PDF or Word documents to firstname.lastname@example.org by 7th July 2012. Subject line of email should read “SUBMISSION [YOUR NAME]”. In the body of the email please state your name, affiliation and in which category (presentation or poster) you wish your submission to be considered. Submissions for presentations that are unsuccessful will be automatically considered for poster presentation. Presenters should be prepared to obtain funding from their home department, or to fund themselves.
Workshop Organisers: Bryony Pierce (Bristol), Robin Scaife (Sheffield) and James Andow (Nottingham)
Participants will discuss how cognitive science and moral psychology can help to more effectively motivate individuals to fulfill their moral obligations to alleviate global poverty. This workshop marks the launch of ASAP’s Moral Psychology and Poverty Alleviation project (MPPA), which aims to support sustained collaborative and applicable research on this issue.
9:00-9:20 – Opening Remarks and Welcome
9:20-10:00 – Dean Spears (Princeton University), “The Hidden Role of Inferred (Implied?) Effectiveness in the Identifiable Victim Effect?”
10:00-10:40 – Gordon Kraft-Todd (Massachusetts General Hospital/Edmund J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard Law School), “It Doesn’t Hurt to Ask for More: Framing Donation Appeals to Optimize Charitable Donations”
10:40-11:20 – Keynote: Paul Slovic (University of Oregon/Decision Research), “Affective and Deliberative Processes Underlying the Arithmetic of Compassion”
11:20-11:30 – Break
11:30 -12:10 – Meena Krishnamurthy (University of Manitoba) and Matthew Lindauer (Yale University), “The Effectiveness of Negative and Positive Duty Based Arguments in Motivating Action to Alleviate Global Poverty”
12:10-12:50 – Luke Buckland (Rutgers University) and Carissa Veliz (CUNY/University of Salamanca), “The Impact of Arguments about Global Poverty on Moral Judgments about Giving”
12:50-2:00 – Lunch
2:00-2:40 – Jay D. Mussen (Harvard University), “Why Don’t We help?: Mere Proximity and Other Factors Affecting the Perceived Moral Obligation to Aid Desperate Strangers”
2:40-3:20 – Judith Lichtenberg (University of Georgetown), “Poverty Alleviation, Demandingness, and the Relativity of Well-Being”
3:20-3:30 – Break
3:30-4:10 – Keynote: Nicole Hassoun (Carnegie Mellon University), “How People Think About Meeting Needs”
4:10-4:50 – William Crouch (Giving What We Can), “Motivating People to Give What They Can: Some findings from the Field”
Sponsors: The British Council, the Global Justice Program of the Whitney and Betty MacMillan Centre for International and Area Studies, the Department of Cognitive Science at Yale University, Kempf Memorial Fund
You can find more information about the conference here.
We are organizing a workshop on "The Scope and Limits of Experimental Ethics" in Konstanz, Germany, September 20-22, 2012. We welcome contributions from all disciplines as long as the problem under investigation is of philosophical relevance. Besides our focus on ethical questions we also encourage contributions which experimentally investigate problems from other philosophical fields.
Additionally, we are open to contributions which critically discuss the role of experimental methods in philosophy in general.
The Mississippi Philosophical Association ("MPA") is soliciting abstracts for presentation at its annual meeting, to be held (Friday-Saturday) October 7-8, 2011, on the Mississippi State University campus in Starkville, MS. The theme for this year's annual meeting is Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics: Surveys, Naturalism, and Tradition, and the keynote speaker is Jonathan Weinberg (University of Arizona).
We seek participants who will illuminate the booming enterprise known as "Experimental Philosophy," either by providing and/or interpreting results from within this enterprise, challenging the foundations or practice of this enterprise, or noting its connections to and/or limitations with regard to philosophical naturalism or other more traditional forms of philosophical inquiry.
While the MPA is a regional organization, we seek broad participation in this conference. Philosophers from all institutions and locations are encouraged to submit abstracts.
Submissions should include a "title page" with the title of the presentation, name(s) of author(s), institutional affiliation, email address, and postal address. A 500 word abstract should be prepared for blind review and sent as a second file (.doc or .pdf only). Email all submissions or questions to J. Robert Thompson (email@example.com)
SUBMISSIONS MUST BE RECEIVED BY AUGUST 25th.
Authors will be notified about submissions by September 1.
For more information about the MPA, consult the association's website here. For more information about the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Mississippi State University click here.
Experimental Philosophy Group UK invites submissions on the topic of experimental philosophy, in two categories:
500-word abstracts for 45-minute presentations (including questions) that report the results of experimental research;
500-word proposals for group discussions. The aim of the discussion sessions will be to facilitate the development of an effective experimental design, drawing on the expertise of the group. Proposals should identify a philosophical question where significant progress can be made by applying experimental methods. Discussions will be introduced by the proposer and chaired by a suitable philosopher/psychologist.
There will be three keynote presentations. We have confirmed two of these: Joshua Knobe (Yale) and Paulo Sousa (QUB).
High-quality submissions in all areas of experimental philosophy considered. Submissions encouraged from all levels of academia. 500-word abstracts to be sent as PDF or Word documents to firstname.lastname@example.org by 20th May 2011. Subject line of email should read “SUBMISSION [YOUR NAME]”. Body of email should include the following information: name and affiliation.
Experimental Philosophy Group UK aims to provide a forum for UK-based researchers from all disciplines who are engaged in or interested in the investigation of philosophical topics using empirical methods. The workshop will have a focus upon (i) providing a platform for UK-based experimental philosophers, (ii) providing instruction in experimental methods and (ii) providing a forum for constructive discussion and collaboration to help and encourage new experimental work.
Registration for this event is expected to open in May. Presenters should be prepared to obtain funding from their home department, or to fund themselves. You can download a PDF copy of this CFP (Download CFP 2nd Workshop of Experimental Philosophy Group UK) or view it on our website here. We look forward to your submissions.
Workshop Organisers: Bryony Pierce (Bristol), Robin Scaife (Sheffield) and James Andow (Nottingham).
October 7, 2011, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands
Invited speakers: Stephen Stich (Rutgers) James Beebe (Buffalo) Stephen Clarke (Oxford) Frank Hindriks (Groningen) Katinka Quintelier (Ghent)
Workshop organizers: Martin Peterson & Krist Vaesen (Eindhoven)
We invite the submission of 500-word abstracts on the topic of experimental philosophy, broadly conceived, for our European Workshop on Experimental Philosophy, to be held October 7, 2011, at Eindhoven University of Technology.
The workshop aims to bring together people in Europe working on or interested in experimental philosophy. Registration for this event will open soon; this will be free of charge. Presenters should be prepared to obtain funding from their home department, or to fund themselves.
Abstracts (PDF-format) should be sent to email@example.com, before June 15, 2011.