In a recent paper (forthcoming in PPR), Dylan Murray and Eddy Nahmias present striking results, using mediation analysis, which seem to suggest that people mistakenly think that under determinism, mental states are bypassed, and this mistake leads to the (apparently) incompatibilist judgments about free will and moral responsibility. But in a new paper, Shaun Nichols and I reexamine the issue using causal modeling. We argue that the causal relationship between incompatibilist judgments and bypassing runs in exactly the opposite direction: incompatibilist judgments about free will lead to bypassing judgments. We hypothesize that this phenomenon occurs because many people think of decisions as essentially indeterministic; thus, when confronted with a description of determinism they tend to think that decisions do not even occur. We provide evidence for this in subsequent studies which show that many participants deny that people make decisions in a deterministic universe; by contrast, most participants tend to allow that people add numbers in a deterministic universe. Together, these studies suggest that bypassing results don't reflect a confusion (as Murray and Nahmias suggest), but rather the depth of the incompatibilist intuition.