Just a quick note to say that I have a new paper coming out in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research that may be of interest to experimental philosophers. In the paper, I suggest that recent methodological debates in philosophy - many centered around experimental methods and findings - have focused too heavily on the mental state type known as intuition.
In fact, as I argue in the paper, there are good empirical reasons to believe that 'intuition' encompasses a rather diverse set of cognitive processes. If this is right, then it may be a mistake to frame debates in terms of, e.g., the reliability of intution as a whole. The reliability of moral cognition, for example, may tell us very little about the relaibility of epistemological cognition. I ultimately suggest that philosophers interested in methodology should focus their investigations more narrowly.
The paper is called "Why intuition?", and it is available through 'Early View' on PPR's website, or through my website here. Comments welcome.