Experimental Philosophy

Second Call for Abstracts - Experimental Philosophy Group UK

17 - 18th September 2011, University of Sheffield

Submission Deadline: 20th May 2011

Experimental Philosophy Group UK invites submissions on the topic of experimental philosophy, in two categories:

1. 500-word abstracts for 45-minute presentations (including questions) that report the results of experimental research;
2. 500-word proposals for group discussions. The aim of the discussion sessions will be to facilitate the development of an effective experimental design, drawing on the expertise of the group. Proposals should identify a philosophical question where significant progress can be made by applying experimental methods. Discussions will be introduced by the proposer and chaired by a suitable philosopher/psychologist.

There will be three keynote presentations. We have confirmed two of these: Joshua Knobe (Yale) and Paulo Sousa (QUB).

High-quality submissions in all areas of experimental philosophy considered. Submissions encouraged from all levels of academia. 500-word abstracts to be sent as PDF or Word documents to experimentalphilosophyuk@gmail.com by 20th May 2011. Subject line of email should read “SUBMISSION [YOUR NAME]”. Body of email should include the following information: name and affiliation.

Experimental Philosophy Group UK aims to provide a forum for UK-based researchers from all disciplines who are engaged in or interested in the investigation of philosophical topics using empirical methods. The workshop will have a focus upon (i) providing a platform for UK-based experimental philosophers, (ii) providing instruction in experimental methods and (ii) providing a forum for constructive discussion and collaboration to help and encourage new experimental work.

Registration for this event is expected to open in May.  Presenters should be prepared to obtain funding from their home department, or to fund themselves.  You can download a PDF copy of this CFP (Download CFP 2nd Workshop of Experimental Philosophy Group UK) or view it on our website here.  We look forward to your submissions.

Workshop Organisers: Bryony Pierce (Bristol), Robin Scaife (Sheffield) and James Andow (Nottingham).

Experiment Month: Help new experimental philosophers.

 Many readers will have noticed the ad on the right side of this page for Experiment Month. This  project hosts 17 different experimental philosophy studies designed by 29 philosophers, each working on illuminating a different philosophical question.  Many of these are first-time experimentalists, who have received help in designing their studies from more seasoned experimental philosophers. (Details about the project are available here).

We are now in the process of helping these philosophers recruit participants for their experiments. So please take a moment to help these philosophers out, either by stopping by the Experiment Month website to fill out a brief questionnaire or by spreading the word about these new studies. 

If we can successfully recruit participants for these studies, we hope eventually to open this site up to other experimental philosophers as a resource for hosting studies online.

(The experiment month initiative is run by Yale Cognitive Science with a grant from the American Philosophical Association.)

 

Experimental Philosophy Lab Meeting in New York (April 22nd, 4--6)

Join the Metro Experimental Research Group for an experimental philosophy lab meeting on Friday, April 22nd, at 4:00 pm at the CUNY Graduate Center, room 5414.  Presentations by Mark Phelan and Richard Samuels will be followed by informal discussion at a local pub. Please note: this and other talks this semester will be held at CUNY. Titles and abstracts follow.

Our entire line up for this semester is available at: http://www.yale.edu/cogsci/mergcalendar.htm

 

 “Group Minds and the Qua Members Principle”

Mark Phelan, Yale University/Lawrence University

Abstract: Recently a major earthquake in Japan captured the attention of the international media. Many members of the American Red Cross heard about the earthquake, as did many employees of Atlantic Records. Still, it seems more appropriate to say that the Red Cross came to believe there had been an earthquake in Japan than to say that Atlantic Records did. Why? I will argue that this is not due to an asymmetry in attributions of group belief. We no more think the American Red Cross, over and above its members, came to believe that there had been an earthquake than we think Atlantic Records did. Rather, I will argue that many group ascriptions are understood as attributions to group members qua members of the relevant group. And they are thought appropriate insofar as the group members exhibit the attributed state in their role qua members of the group.

 

“Folk and Scientific Notions of Innateness”

Richard Samuels, The Ohio State University

Abstract: Many terms that have widespread currency in contemporary science also have roots firmly planted in folk thought about the world. In this talk, I focus on one such notion: innateness. Specifically, I report a series of experiments –run in collaboration with Josh Kobe— which explore the extent to which scientists and naive subjects differ in their application of "innate." Though these studies suggest a complex pattern of similarities and differences between scientists and naive participants, two findings seem especially intriguing: a) Contrary to what one might have supposed, membership of a scientific community appears to exert relatively little influence on response profiles. b) The innateness judgments of scientists and non-scientists alike are heavily influenced by the opportunity to explicitly reflect upon the differences between closely related developmental scenarios. I conclude by exploring a range of potential explanations for these, and related, findings.

 

Society for Empirical Ethics -- Pacific APA

The Society for Empirical Ethics will host a session at the upcoming Pacific APA on "Meta-Ethical Commitments: Are the Folk Objectivists?" -- come join us!

• James Beebee, State University of New York, Buffalo

•  Shaun Nichols, University of Arizona

• Hagop Sarkissian, Baruch College

• Jen Cole Wright, College of Charleston

 

Folk Intuitions and the Hard Problem

In “Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience” (2010), Edouard Machery and I presented evidence that in contrast to most philosophers, ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities.  On the basis of these results, we then argued against a standard justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. 

In a fascinating article—“The Irrelevance of Folk Intuitions to the 'Hard Problem' of Consciousness”—Brian Talbot challenges our argument: He charges that the studies we presented in our (2010) elicited System-One judgments and that such judgments are irrelevant to assessing the reality of the hard problem.

We respond to this critique in a new paper—“On the Relevance of Folk Intuitions: A Reply to Talbot”—reporting the results of four new studies testing Talbot’s account.

Both Talbot’s critique and our response are forthcoming in a special issue of Consciousness and Cognition.

The Character Project

The Character Project at Wake Forest University is very excited to launch its funding competition entitled "New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Character." This $300,000 RFP is aimed at work in philosophy on the topic of character, and proposals can request between $40,000 and $100,000 for projects not to exceed one year in duration. We hope to make between 5-6 awards. A residential incentive of $6,000 for one semester or $12,000 for an academic year will be offered to philosophy RFP winners who are willing to move to Wake Forest University during the award period, and this stipend would not count as part of the research funding request. A willingness to move will not be taken into account when evaluating proposals.

Since work here will primarily be theoretical, the funding is aimed at semester or yearlong sabbatical research leave projects involving a book manuscript or series of substantive articles on character.

This competition is supported by a generous grant from the John Templeton Foundation.

For more details, please visit www.thecharacterproject.com

Congratulations to...

those graduate students who have either used or discussed experimental methods as part of their philosphical work and have obtained a job in this very difficult job market:

Jonah Schupbach (Pitt, HPS), who has worked on the intuitive understanding of explanatory power (forthcoming in Philosophy of Science) and on the Linda Fallacy. Hired by the University of Utah (tt).

Jonathan Livengood (Pitt, HPS), who has worked on semantic intuitions, causal judgment, philosophical temperament and a host of other issues. Hired by the University of Illinois (tt).

Mark Phelan (UNC, Yale), who has worked on metaphors, intentional action, and many other issues. Hired by Lawrence University (tt).

Felipe de Brigard (UNC), who has worked on happiness, free will, and is doing some exciting neuroscientif work on memory. Hired by Harvard (post-doc).

Eric Mandelbaum (UNC), who has worked on the abstract/concrete paradox and many other issues. Hired by Yale (ACLS).

Jenny Nado (Rutgers), who has discussed metaphilosophical questions raised by experimental philosophy and published on intentionality. Hired by Lingnan University (tt).

Mark Alfano (CUNY), who has done some work on intentionality and the possible use of behavioral economics methods in experimental philosophy. Hired by Notre Dame Institute for Advanced Study (post-doc).

Joshua May (UCSB), who has done work in experimental epistemology. Hired by Monash University (3-year position).

This is really impressive! 

Updated 04/10 10:00am

(If I have forgotten someone, send me an e-mail and I will update this post.)

 

Symposium on Experimental Ethics at Georgetown (April 8-10)

On April 8-10, the Georgetown Philosophy Department, Georgetown University Law Center, and the journal Ethics will be jointly hosting a symposium on “Experiment and Intuition in Ethics.”  The symposium will bring together researchers in experimental ethics and leading moral philosophers to discuss and reflect on the implications of the recent experimental turn in ethics. The speakers will be David Brink, Sarah Buss, Jonathan Dancy, Joshua Greene, John Mikhail, Shaun Nichols, Jesse Prinz, and Peter Railton.  Papers will be made available to registrants only and will be expected to have been read in advance by all who attend.  More information can be found via this link.

 

Experimental Philosophy Lab Meeting in NYC: Gerken and Leslie (April 8th)

Join the Metro Experimental Research Group for an experimental philosophy lab meeting on Friday, April 8th, at 4:00 pm at the CUNY Graduate Center, room 9206.  Presentations by Mikkel Gerken and Sarah-Jane Leslie will be followed by informal discussion at a local pub. Please note: this and other talks this semester will be held at CUNY. Titles and abstracts follow.

Our entire line up for this semester is available at: http://www.yale.edu/cogsci/mergcalendar.htm

 

“On the Cognitive Bases of Knowledge Ascriptions”

Mikkel Gerken 

 University of Copenhagen

I will discuss an epistemic focal bias account of judgments about knowledge ascriptions. According this account, such judgments are generally reliable but systematically fallible because the cognitive processes that generate them are affected by what is in focus for the judging subject. I will argue that such an epistemic focal bias account of contrast effects and salient alternatives effects can be embedded in a broad dual process framework. I consider various strategies for testing the dual process version of the epistemic focal bias account empirically and conclude by some methodological reflections concerning the role of cognitive psychology in epistemological theorizing.

 

“Generics and Generalization"

Sarah-Jane Leslie

Princeton University

Generics are sentences such as "tigers are striped" and "ravens are black". They are truth-conditionally complex: e.g. "ducks lay eggs" is judged true while "ducks are female" is rejected as false, despite the fact that only female ducks lay eggs. Similarly, "mosquitoes carry malaria" is accepted but "books are paperbacks" is rejected, yet over 80% books are paperbacks, while less than 1% of mosquitoes carry malaria. Despite their seeming complexity, I argue that generics give voice to cognitively primitive generalizations, while quantified statements give voice to more cognitively sophisticated and taxing ones. Further, the puzzling truth-conditional behavior of generics can be explained by an empirically plausible characterization of these primitive generalizations. When I first argued for these hypotheses, it was on the basis of largely theoretical/philosophical considerations. I now present a range of recent experimental evidence in support of these hypotheses.

 

Special issue of Metaphilosophy

The article mentioned in my post below ("Thought Experiments and Philosophical Knowledge") is now out in the 40th anniversary special issue of Metaphilosophy. 

The article by Williamson ("Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof") and by Kitcher ("Philosophy Inside Out") may be of interest to the readers of this blog.