Levin on X-Phi

I just found this critical notice by Janet Levin, which came out in the October issue of Analysis:

http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/extract/69/4/761

She discusses nearly every chapter in the collection by Knobe and Nichols, Experimental Philosophy, and ultimately argues that:

the results of the most methodologically sound and philosophically relevant studies discussed in this volume could have been obtained from the armchair, and thus that experimental philosophy may not present a serious challenge to the traditional methods of analytic philosophy. (p. 761)

However, I think this statement of her conclusion is a bit misleading. Sometimes she does, as this quote indicates, simply want to reject the revisionist claim that x-phi should replace the armchair entirely (or pretty much entirely).  But at other times she seems to be targeting the more modest claim that x-phi is a more promising methodology for some projects in philosophy. For example, she says "it seems that traditional analytic methods may well suffice for identifying the judgements that provide the right sorts of data for philosophical theories" (p. 767). Here she's not just saying x-phi doesn't undermine the armchair entirely; she's suggesting the armchair is as good as x-phi at gathering the relevant information about our concepts and so on.

Anywho, I thought readers of this blog might like to take a look at her piece if they haven't already.

Comments

[Lou Agosta]

One can always learn something from Janet Levin, and her note is no exception. Thanks to Josh for pointing out her commentary on Knobe and Nichols. Experimental philosophy really started to get traction in Locke’s engaging answer to William Molyneux’s thought experiment about the individual blind from birth who suddenly gets his vision. What happens? In a daring experiment, which gives the subtitle to the book, The Man Who Dared to See (Kurson 2007), Mike May’s immune system was chemically “killed” so that a stem cell transplant could be used to restore the nerves in his retina. As a result, May’s eyes and optics were restored to a state that was near perfect. This is in contrast to the experience of the visual world that he encountered after the bandages were removed following the last in a series of operations to restore his sight. The operation was a success in that the optical apparatus was functioning as designed. But there was a “but…” In short, the auto at which May was supposedly looking did not make sense as a visual experience. More precisely, Mike’s visual experience of the auto or other things did not make sense. His visual apparatus did not make sense out of the inputs that the experience of the would-be yellow auto was providing. His visual apparatus did integrate the input caused by the auto (which auto, of course, was available through other sensory modes). Given his visual experience, Mike was inferring that the auto was yellow; he was not in direct contact with the yellow station wagon. Note well that Mike May was inferring that the auto was yellow, which means he was not directly in touch with it – this was not normal. This must be underscored. May’s use of inference to get in touch visually with the auto was significantly different than what everyone else does. In spite of all the operations, he did not have normal vision. The swirling constellation of colors and shapes did not have sense as a coherent, unified, objective thing with a spatial boundary. This counts towards Searle’s naïve realistic point that viewers do not infer things, they see them, relate to them, interact with them, etc. However, this also counts as evidence that sense and the sense of objects in the world is constituted by acts of intentionality that are prepredicative, nonlinguistic, nonverbal - in this case, acts of intentional synthesis of the kind invoked by the later Husserl. What did you think the experiment was going to show?
One lesson? Maybe the experiments collected by Knobe and Nichols were good, but they were not that good. Maybe the analysis was good, but not that good.
Another lesson? Philosophers ignore the advances of empirical science at their own peril. It is particularly interesting when diverse Gedanken experiments have the brains (central nervous systems (CNS)) of individuals hooked up by imaginary wires. Depending on where you draw the system boundary, different philosophical paradoxes arise. Meanwhile, science advances. Then it turns up that people are indeed already hooked up by the action of mirror neurons. True, there is still action-at-a-distance – but that makes it even more interesting. The philosophers have to change the Gedanken experiment so that the hook is not too similar to what we now know to be the case in the everyday world - we are corrected in fundamental ways experientially as our organisms resonate in reaction to one another. Please do not tell me that Descartes ever envisioned that one as he sat alone in his warm room meditating on first philosophy.
The third lesson? The main threat to analytic philosophy (or continental philosophy or your choice of philosophy) is not experimental philosophy. It is analytic philosophy. (Please make the corresponding substitutions.) As soon as philosophers loose touch with the method of sustained inquiry that drove Socrates, Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Austin, etc. the game is up. What Kant called “dialectical illusion” looms large and curious puzzles take the place of fundamental inquiry into the big issues that attract students, professionals, people to philosophy in the first place. Further details on the strengths and limitations of experimental philosophy are to be found in an unpublished essay by yours truly on the relevance of neuro-phenomenology to the philosophy of empathy entitled “The Light Goes on!” at www.EmpathyInTheContextOfPhilosophy.com.

[anon]

Why delete those mild anonymous comments, and leave up the gobbledygook of that first comment? Calling out kookiness as such is surely a legitimate philosophical act.

[tnadelhoffer]

Sorry anon. I logged onto TypePad to clean out several of the spam comments and I accidentally deleted one otherwise legitimate comment. It happens sometimes. I have no idea how and why the spammers like this blog, but a surprising amount of their total b.s. gets through. As a result, I end up occasionally deleting comments that should have remained on-line. Sorry again...