Experimental Philosophy

Experimental Philosophy of Consciousness

One of the most exciting developments in experimental philosophy these days is the explosion of new work on intuitions about consciousness. How do people determine whether an entity is capable of having phenomenal states like feeling pain or experiencing happiness? And how do the criteria for these phenomenal states differ from those for other states like belief and desire?

It seems to me that the results from these studies are gradually converging on a view according to which people's intuitions about whether an agent has conscious states are especially influenced by facts about that agent's body. We can see this pattern coming out if we look at a number of different kinds of agents that don't seem to have the right sorts of bodies.

First, take 'group agents' (corporations, teams, governments, etc.). People are perfectly willing to describe group agents using sentences that involve mental states like 'Microsoft intends to release a new product,' but they refuse to describe group agents using sentences that involve phenomenally conscious states like 'Microsoft is feeling a little depressed.' Perhaps this is because group agents don't have bodies of the right sort. (For discussion, see Arico; Huebner, Bruno & Sarkissian; Knobe & Prinz; Sytsma & Machery.)

Turning to intuitions about robots, we find exactly the same sort of pattern: a willingness to ascribe beliefs but an unwillingness to ascribe, e.g., feelings of pain. The lack of an appropriate sort of body strikes again. (Huebner; Sytsma & Machery)

And now suppose we look to the ultimate disembodied agent: God. There, we find the very same pattern recurring, with a willingness to ascribe belief, planning, etc. but a reluctance to ascribe occurent feelings and emotions (Gray, Gray & Wegner).

Overall, it definitely is beginning to look like there is some sort of connection between people's willingness to say that an agent has phenomenal consciousness and their beliefs about that agent's body. But now a new question arises. Why exactly is all of this happening?

[For an incredibly brief review of these studies, see the paper here.]

Diversity at SPP

Thanks to Anne Jacobson for pointing me towards this blog about diversity at the SPP.  Given the comment thread on this blog about diversity in x-phi that occurred after last year's workshop at the SPP, this should be of interest to many of you. 

p.s.  As an aside, I have to say that every time I am at one of the "smokers" at the Eastern APA, I am reminded of how shamefully underrepresented women are in the disclipline of philosophy.  Let's hope this season's job market moves us a few steps in right direction.

Penn's Neuroscience Bootcamp

Martha Farah suggested that the readers of this blog might be interested in the upcoming Neuroscience Bootcamp that is being organized through U Penn's Neuroethics Program:

The University of Pennsylvania announces their Neuroscience Boot Camp, August 2-12, 2009.

Why Neuroscience Boot Camp?

Neuroscience is increasingly relevant to a number of professions and academic disciplines beyond its traditional medical applications.  Lawyers, educators, economists and businesspeople, as well as scholars of philosophy, sociology, applied ethics and policy, are incorporating the concepts and methods of neuroscience into their work.  Indeed, for any field in which it is important to understand, predict or influence human behavior, neuroscience will play an increasing role.  The Penn Neuroscience Boot Camp is designed to give participants a basic foundation in cognitive and affective neuroscience and to equip them to be informed consumers of neuroscience research.

What happens at Neuroscience Boot Camp?

Through a combination of lectures, break-out groups, panel discussions and laboratory visits, participants will gain an understanding of the methods of neuroscience and key findings on the cognitive and social-emotional functions of the brain, lifespan development and disorders of brain function.

Each lecture will be followed by extensive Q&A.  Break-out groups will allow participants to delve more deeply into topics of relevance to their fields.  Laboratory visits will include trip to an MRI scanner, an EEG/ERP lab, an animal neurophysiology lab, and a transcranial magnetic stimulation lab.  Participants will also have access to an extensive online library of copyrighted materials selected for relevance to the Boot Camp, including classic and review articles and textbook chapters in cognitive and affective neuroscience and the applications of neuroscience to diverse fields.

Who should apply?

College and university faculty, working professionals and graduate students are encouraged to apply.  The only prerequisites are a grasp of basic statistics and at least a dim recollection of high school biology and physics.  (A short set of readings will be made available prior to the Boot Camp to remind you about the essentials.)

More details:

Participants will be housed on campus in air-conditioned apartment-style suites with private bedrooms.  Sessions begin at 9 AM and end at 6:15.  Breakfast and lunch will be eaten with the group; dinners are on your own.

The academic program spans nine days, Monday, August 3rd -Wednesday, August 12th with half of Saturday and all of Sunday off.  There will be an opening reception on the evening of Sunday August 2nd and a gala dinner the last evening in the Lower Egypt gallery of the University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archeology and Anthropology.

The cost of tuition, room and board is $3,000 and scholarships are available.  Complete applications are due by midnight on February 1st.  You will be notified of the status of your application by March 6th, and will have until April 1st to confirm attendance

Visit http://neuroethics.upenn.edu/boot_camp.html for more information!

Thanks very much in advance!

Blogs for the Break

While some of you are already familiar with the following two interesting blogs, I have only recently discovered them.  The first is the Arche Methodology Project Weblog.  The second--which is the progeny of our own Justin Sytsma--is My Mind is Made Up.  If you have any other interesting blogs or webpages you'd like to share with the x-phi community, post a comment and I will add them to the growing lists!

New Search Function

Simon Cullen recently made a very helpful suggestion.  Given that we are soon going to cross the 400 post thresh hold, it would be useful to have each of the past and future posts properly categorized.  In light of his suggestion, I ask that in the future all contributors make sure their posts are properly categorized.  In the event that a new category is needed, simply add it.  For my part, I will spend the next few months trying to go back and make sure the past 375+ posts are placed into their appropriate categories.  In the event that some of you are willing to go back and recategorize your own prior posts, please let me know.  I would be more than delighted to have your help!  In the meantime, I have added a google search function to the side bar so that people can locate old posts more readily.  It may take Google a few days to completely index the site, but after that it should be a useful addition to the blog.  As always, if you have any other suggestions, please don't hesitate to let me know!

Jackson on X-Phi

Thanks to all the folks who sent me a link to Frank Jackson's recent NDPR review of the recent Experimental Philosophy anthology that was edited by Knobe and Nichols (a link to this volume can be found in the sidebar to the left).  A quick google search also turned up this video of a recent talk by Jackson at Swarthmore entitled "Conceptual Analysis and Experimental Philosophy."  I suspect this is a version of the talk he gave at the ANU conference on X-phi back in 2007.

Andrew Cullison asks: hey, what's going on here?

From a recent blog post by Andrew Cullison:

Here are two quotes from the first few pages in the new reader Experimental Philosophy edited by Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols.

Of course, the most salient difference is just the fact that experimental philosophers conduct experiments and conceptual analysts do not. Thus, the conceptual analyst might write, “In this case, one would surely say…,” while the experimental philosopher would write, “In this case, 79% of subjects said…” (page 4)

But just after that we get…

Not only does it seem to us that empirical considerations can be relevant here; it seems to us just obvious that empirical considerations are relevant. Surely, the degree to which an intuition is warranted depends in part on the process that generated it, and surely the best way to figure out which processes generate which intuitions is to go out and gather empirical data. How else is one supposed to proceed? (page8)

I’m not trying to engage in Gotcha! Philosophy. But the passages taken together are, at least, initially puzzling.

He has more to say from there, and there's lots to discuss -- I'll turn off comments here, since it's his post & he should get the benefit of the traffic!

What ever happened to the SEEP idea?

During the summer Thomas initiated a discussion about starting a Society for Empirical and Experimental Philosophy. I was just wondering what ever came of that.