Experimental Philosophy

Call for Papers 2: Special Issue on Experimental Philosophy

Let me remind you that the European Review of Philosophy is editing a special issue on psychology and experimental philosophy (editors: Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo and myself).

Our guest authors are D. Osherson (Princeton), Sean Kelly (Harvard), and John Darley and Geoffrey Goodwin (Princeton).

The deadline is September 1, 2008 and more information can be found there.

Edouard

Update: By mistake, I wrote that the deadline was in 2009. It is in fact 09/01/2008.

Reminder: Upcoming Society for Empirical Ethics Session

Just a quick reminder of the upcoming SEE session at the Central APA -- on Saturday from 12:15-2:15. The presenters will be Darcia Narvaez, John Mikhail, and Geoffrey Goodwin. Papers/presentations will be posted on my website (link to the left, and then click on "philosophy").

See you there!

Moral Psychology meets Moral Philosophy

I've been working out some thoughts with Liane Young on the relevance of moral psychology to moral philosophy.  Here's the current draft of our essay on the subject.  It is to be published in an issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice on empirical approaches to ethics, put together by Neil Levy.  I think there's still time for us to make edits, if anybody has suggestions.  In any event, I'm curious to get the perspective of philosophers on the ideas in here.  Looking forward to your thoughts...

Fiery

Download psych_of_dilemmas.pdf

The Collective Conscious

Consider the sentences:

1. Dmitri is experiencing great joy at his new job.

2. Sony is experiencing great joy at its increased sales.

If you're like me, your immediate intuition is that the first of these sentences makes a lot of sense while the second is completely ridiculous.  A corporation like Sony can't be experiencing great joy! Group agents like corporations just aren't the sort of entity that are capable of phenomenal consciousness.

In an exciting new paper, the philosophers Bryce Huebner, Michael Bruno and Hagop Sarkissian show that this sort of intuition is not nearly as universal as one might have supposed.  In fact, they show a dramatic cultural difference between the intuitions of Americans and the intuitions of Hong Kong residents.  Americans think the first sentence sounds a lot more natural than the second while Hong Kong residents think that the two sentences are fairly similar in the degree of naturalness.  (Even Hong Kong residents think that the first sentence is better than the second, but this effect is not nearly as strong in the Hong Kong sample as it is in the American sample.)

Drawing on these new results, Huebner and colleagues argue that there are important cultural differences in the way people think about individuals versus groups.  Americans see a yawning gulf between individuals and groups -- individuals can be conscious and groups cannot -- while Hong Kong residents think that group agents are actually fairly similar to individual people. 

Are We Dumb(founded) or Dubious?

My student, Bradley Thomas, and I have been wondering if there is a problematic confounding factor in the infamous trolley cases. If you are like us (and many of our students), one reason you answer that it’s wrong to push the fat man off the footbridge is not so much that you think it is morally inappropriate but that you think it is stupid. A fat man is not going to stop a train! So, while it’s highly believable that pushing the fat man will kill him, it’s unbelievable that doing so will actually save five people. In contrast, it is believable enough that you could throw a switch to make a train avoid five people so that doing so will in fact save them, though it will also kill one worker. 

Of course, you are told to believe what the scenario says, but that’s hard to do when what it says is so … silly. Some people may overtly reject the purported “facts” of the case. Others may try to accept them but be unable to “internalize” them in such a way that their moral intuitions properly respond to those facts. As Anthony Appiah points out in his recent book, these dilemmas ask us to imagine what should be done in emergency situations and, if we are able to imagine that, we may employ heuristics to make quick moral judgments, heuristics like: “Don’t risk killing an innocent person unless you feel quite confident it will save more innocent persons.”

So, we are trying to test (a) whether this “epistemic” confound may be exaggerating the large differences in responses to Switch and Footbridge cases, differences usually explained in terms of the effects on people’s intuitions of killing by personal contact and/or of killing a person as a means to an end rather than as a side-effect of that end (we are not trying to show that these effects are not significant), and (b) whether this confound has been discounted as an explanation for people’s divergent responses to the two cases, such that people may be less dumbfounded than some have claimed. Instead, they may be dubious.

For instance, if we’re not mistaken, Fiery Cushman and Liane Young (in their wonderful 2007 M&L paper) treated subjects who explained their divergent moral judgments in terms of rejecting stipulations of one of the scenarios as “morally dumbfounded”—that is, they coded such explanations as “Alternative explanation: added assumption,” rather than as “Sufficient” (i.e., explanations that recognize the “personal” nature of Footbridge vs. the “impersonal” nature of Switch). If we are correct, subjects’ explaining that they reject the stipulations of a case should similarly count as an adequate explanation of their judgments, at least if they seem to recognize that they are answering differently in part because the scenarios differ in their believability.

We have some preliminary results showing that the degree to which participants believe the purported outcomes of moral dilemmas is highly correlated with their moral judgments (e.g., the more they believe that smothering their child in the circumstances of the scenario will save their other three children, then more they agree that smothering their child is the right thing to do). The tests below are meant to further test this hypothesis. We think the results are potentially important both for what they reveal about people’s moral intuitions and the relation of such intuitions to their “epistemic” intuitions and also for what they may say about the methodology of experimental philosophy—i.e., how (and when) can we trust judgments about unbelievable philosophical thought experiments?

We hope you will provide feedback about our hypothesis and also about our scenarios, which we have found excruciatingly difficult to develop. We're really hoping you save us from headaches down the road by finding any flaws that we've overlooked!  For all four of our cases, in addition to asking the standard “How morally appropriate is it for [agent] to do X [the act that leads to one being killed]?”, we also ask four questions about believability that take this basic form:

How likely do you think it is that, if [agent] does NOT do X, the five workers will be killed and the one worker will survive?

How likely do you think it is that, if [agent] DOES do X, the one worker will be killed?

How likely do you think it is that, if [agent] DOES do X, the five workers will survive?

How likely do you think it is that the ONLY way for [agent] to save the five workers is to do X?

Here is our version of the impersonal Switch case, which we call "believable" to indicate that it is rather believable that flipping the switch will actually save the five (it has been modified from the traditional Switch cases in order to make it more parallel with the new cases we constructed to test our hypotheses):

Frank is the only passenger in the front car of a subway train on some elevated tracks; the conductor just shouted that the brakes have failed, and then passed out over the controls. Frank knows about subway trains and knows that the automatic braking system at the next station will stop the train, so Frank, the conductor, and the other passengers are not in danger. But he sees that the train is speeding toward five people working ahead on the tracks; they are on a high overpass so they cannot escape in time. Frank also sees that there is a side track leading off to the left and, if he can flip a switch on the train's control panel, it will turn the train onto the side track where there is one person working on the tracks. The only way for Frank to prevent the deaths of the five workers on the main track is to flip the switch in order to turn the train onto the side track. If Frank flips the switch, the one worker on the side track will be run over and killed. If Frank does nothing, the five workers on the main track will run over and killed.

To examine our question of whether believability influences people's judgments about this case, we have constructed an unbelievable impersonal dilemma called Statue to match the believable impersonal Switch case above. Like Switch, Statue is impersonal (no contact), killing the one is a side-effect of the means used to save the five, and performing the proposed action is likely to kill the one (just as flipping the switch will kill the one worker on the side track). However, in contrast to Switch, in Statue (like the Footbridge case) we have attempted to make it unbelievable that performing the proposed impersonal action will actually save the five workers. If believability, or epistemic intuitions that contradict the stipulations of the thought experiment, are part of the driving force behind the difference in people's judgments about the Switch vs. Footbridge cases, then we would expect that judgments about this Statue scenario to move in the direction of judgments about Footbridge (and that judgments of appropriateness will correlate with judgments of believability). Below is our version of Statue, or if you are curious to see what these will look like on our online surveys, you can see the Statue case by clicking here

John is on a footbridge over some elevated subway tracks. John can see that a subway train approaching the footbridge is out of control, with its conductor alive but passed out over the controls. John knows about subway trains and knows that the automatic braking system at the next station will stop the train so the conductor and passengers are not in danger. But he sees that the train is speeding toward five people working ahead on the tracks; the tracks are so high that they cannot escape in time. John also sees that the only way to stop the train is to drop a weight onto it heavy enough to break through the cockpit window and depress the emergency brake switch on the control panel beneath the passed-out conductor. The only available, sufficiently heavy weight on the footbridge is a large statue next to John. The only way for John to prevent the deaths of the five workers is to push the statue off the footbridge and through the cockpit window in order to depress the brake switch on the control panel beneath the conductor. If John pushes the statue off the footbridge, the conductor will be crushed and killed. If John does nothing, the five workers on the track will be run over and killed.

Similarly, we have tried to construct a believable personal dilemma called Conductor to compare with the unbelievable personal Footbridge case (this was a hard one to create!). Like Footbridge, Conductor is personal (involves contact), killing the one is a *means* to saving the five, and performing the proposed action is likely to kill the one (as pushing the fat man will kill him). However, in contrast to Footbridge, in Conductor we have tried to make it believable that performing the proposed personal action will actually save the five workers. If believability is part of the driving force behind the difference in people's judgments about the Switch vs. Footbridge cases, then we would expect judgments about this Conductor scenario to move in the direction of judgments about Switch (and that judgments of appropriateness will correlate with judgments of believability). Below is our Conductor scenario, followed by our version of Footbridge (again modified from the original to make it more parallel with our other cases):

Your comments are very much appreciated!

Thanks, Eddy and Bradley

 

Conductor

Steve is the only passenger in the front car of a subway train on some elevated tracks; the conductor is alive but has passed out over the controls. Steve knows about subway trains and knows that the automatic braking system at the next station will stop the train, so Steve, the conductor, and the other passengers are not in danger. But he sees that the train is speeding toward five people working ahead on the tracks; the tracks are so high that they cannot escape in time. Steve also sees that if he can pull down the emergency brake lever located under the control panel, the train will stop before it hits the five workers. The train’s cockpit is so narrow that the only way to get to the brake lever in time is to push the conductor off of the controls and out of the doorway of the speeding train. The only way for Steve to prevent the deaths of the five workers on the main track is to push the conductor out of the train in order to pull down the brake lever. If Steve pushes the conductor out of the train, the conductor will be killed by the impact. If Steve does nothing, the five workers will be run over and killed.

Footbridge

Bill is on a footbridge over some elevated subway tracks. Bill can see that a subway train approaching the footbridge is out of control, with its conductor alive but passed out in the cockpit. Bill knows about subway trains and knows that the automatic braking system at the next station will stop the train so the conductor and passengers are not in danger. But he sees that the train is speeding toward five people working ahead on the tracks; the tracks are so high that they cannot escape in time. Bill also sees that the only way to stop the train is to drop a weight onto it heavy enough to break through the cockpit window and depress the emergency brake switch on the control panel. The only available, sufficiently heavy weight on the footbridge is a very large subway worker who has fainted next to Bill. The only way for Bill to prevent the deaths of the five workers on the track is to push the large worker off the footbridge and through the cockpit window in order to depress the brake switch. If Bill pushes the large worker off the footbridge, the worker will be killed by the impact. If Bill does nothing, the five workers on the track will be run over and killed.

X-Phi of Science in Philosophy Compass

I see that Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz have a new contribution up at Philosophy Compass on "Experimental Philosophy of Science". Here's the abstract:

Experimental philosophy of science gathers empirical data on how key scientific concepts are understood by particular scientific communities. In this paper we briefly describe two recent studies in experimental philosophy of biology, one investigating the concept of the gene, the other the concept of innateness. The use of experimental methods reveals facts about these concepts that would not be accessible using the traditional method of intuitions about possible cases. It also contributes to the study of conceptual change in science, which we understand as the result of a form of conceptual ecology, in which concepts become adapted to specific epistemic niches.

I think very highly of Karola and Paul's work, and it represents an extremely important type of x-phi work that perhaps doesn't get as much attention as some of the other x-phi work that interfaces more with mind/metaphysics/epistemology. Their experimental designs are terrific, and if nothing else, they put completely to rest the oft-heard claim that x-phi is nothing more than checking the gut intuitions of the untutored folk. If you don't already know their work, the Phil Compass piece is a great place to check it out.

Moral Judgments about Implicit Race Bias

I'm a social psychology graduate student working at UNC Chapel-Hill with Dr. Keith Payne, who specializes in unconscious and unintended cognitive processes.  In particular, our lab is interested in implicit race bias, or racial biases that are either outside of awareness or beyond our control.  Because awareness and control are typically considered the two main criteria for the ascription of moral responsibility, such biases present a problem for moral appraisal: do we punish discrimination regardless of the mental states involved, or do we exculpate the agent because he or she lacks awareness and control?  There are no easy answers to this question, and psychologists working in this field are all over the map in terms of the ethical implications of these findings.  Moreover, social psychologists in this field are being brought into courtrooms for disparate treatment cases, suggesting that at least legal conceptions are going to start being influenced by the science.  Yet no one has empirically examined the effects of theories of implicit bias upon people's intuitions about moral responsibility.

We recently collaborated with Joshua Knobe on a project investigating how people attribute moral responsibility for discrimination described in terms of implicit race bias.  Three types of discrimination were presented, in the contexts of promotions, renting, and grading.  In all cases, we presented an agent who endorses egalitarianism.  Yet for some reason or other, the agent fails to live up to these explicit principles, and discriminates.  What changed across conditions were the extra details:

- In the "Unconscious Condition', we suggested that implicit race bias is unconscious.  That is, the agent was unaware of the bias, and it led to discriminatory behavior.  Note that lack of awareness precludes the possibility of control.

- In the 'Automatic Condition', we suggested that the implicit race bias is automatic and uncontrollable.  That is, the agent was aware of the bias, but unable to prevent it from influencing bhavior.

- In the 'Folk Condition', we didn't provide any theory of implicit race bias to explain the discriminatory behavior, implying that the agent is a hypocrite who says one thing and does another.

The unconscious and automatic conditions represent the two prominent theoretical views about implicit race bias.  The design was between-subjects, so that each participant saw a scenario for only the unconscious, automatic, or folk conditions (and for one of the three discrimination contexts, which were there for generality, and no effects were expected across context).  They were then asked four questions about moral responsibility (i.e. 'Is John morally responsible ...', 'Should John be punished...' etc; though conceptually questions of moral responsibility and punishment/blame do come apart, the composite of these items had high reliability so was kept together). 

In the first study, people attributed significantly less moral responsibility in the unconscious condition compared to the other two conditions.  There was no significant difference in responsibility attributions between the automatic and folk conditions.  In a second study, we replicated this basic pattern and also tested for potential mediators.  There were three we had in mind.  First, maybe the lack of awareness implied by unconscious bias also implies lack of intent -- so maybe the agent lacked intent, and that's why she could not be held responsible.  Second, maybe the unconscious bias did not represent the agent's true self -- i.e. the agent could not have possibly endorsed an unconscious bias, so it shouldn't be counted as self-representative or blameworthy.  Third, maybe participants felt less negative emotion toward the agent in the unconscious condition.  It turns out that negative emotion was the only mediator.  In fact, the pattern of means for intent was the exact opposite of the pattern for moral responsibility!  In other words, people attributed the highest intent to discriminate to the agent in the unconscious condition, even though that agent was assigned the lowest moral responsibility; and vice versa for the folk condition. 

In the paper, we draw out potential social and ethical implications as well.  Anyhow, the full details of the paper can be viewed here:

http://www.unc.edu/~dcameron/Moral_Responsibility_3.17.08.pdf

Thanks for letting me post, I'd love to hear any and all feedback you all may have.

-Daryl