In a series of well-written and well-researched articles, Gregory Mitchell--the Sheila McDevit professor of Law at Florida State University--has launched an assualt on the behavioral law and economics movement (or as he calls it, "legal decision theory"). Legal decision theorists typcially rely on empirical research from social psychology--especially the research on heuristics and biases--to undermine some of the foundational assumptions of traditional law and economics (especially the rational actor models of human psychology and decision-making so prevalent among economists). According to Mitchel, legal decision theorists all-too-often make sweeping claims about human rationality (or lack thereof) that often go well beyond the data that have been collected. On his view, much more caution is in order. Conceding that many of the recent developments in social psychology give us reason for being suspicious of many of the main tenents of law and economics, Mitchell nevertheless thinks that legal decision theorists overstate their case--a trend that he believes may unfortunately threaten to undermine the long-term credibility of empirical research among legal theorists. Mitchell points out a number of problems with the research that is relied on by legal decision theorists--many of which are relevant to the work being done in experimental philosophy. For example, small sample sizes, the near exclusive reliance on between-subject studies, using the rational or right choice as the null-hypothesis, the overstating of the significance of "statistical significance," the dearth of meta-analyses, making inferences about individual differences based on group differences, etc. Nearly all of the worries that Mitchell expresses about legal decision theory are worries that apply equally to the kinds of studies that we experimental philosophers have relied on so far. As such, I think we would all do well to pay attention to Mitchell's important work in this area.