Philosophy and Public Policy

I realize this post is not really something directly relevant to experimental philosophy--but given the recent Supreme Court ruling concerning the execution of juveniles, I figure it is topical enough to merit attention. Plus, I am presently too busy with dissertation writing to post anything more philosophically substantive in nature!

Studies show that a majority of Americans believe that harsh legal sanctions--e.g., the death penalty, manditory-minimum sentences, three strikes and you're out laws, etc--deter crime. Studies also show that these beliefs may very well be false. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that harsh penalties do not reduce crime, why should we be beholden to the intuitions of average Americans? Of course, even if we agree that we should not be beholden, what other choice do we have? Legislators are supposed to cater to our interests--which are in turn determined to a large extent by our beliefs. As a result, no legislator who wanted to be either elected or reelected would suggest that we should be "softer on crime"--even though it may turn out that "being softer on crime" would ultimately reduce crime. For instance, if we spent more money on preventative measures such as improved primary and secondary education and better funded community outreach programs as well as on better rehabilitative programs such as drug treatment, vocational training, and anger management, we might see a reduction in violent crime. Yet, these kinds of programs are typically unpopular with the "average Joe"--who thinks these are just liberal attempts to coddle criminals. Hence, there is virtually no chance that the only kinds of programs that might actually reduce the number of violent crimes in this country will be adopted--while obscene amounts of money continue to be spent on constructing prisons (indeed, some states spend nearly as much on their "criminal justice systems" as on their educational systems!). How is this pernicious cycle to be broken? More specifically, isn't this an area where philosophers--along with criminologists, sociologists,and psychologists--ought to be doing more byway of educating the public? Peter Singer once famously suggested that philosophers were finally "back on the job"--i.e., that philosophers are finally starting to take a more active role in public policy issues. Should this be part of our job qua philosophers? If so, what is the best way of living up to our civil duties and obligations? If not, whose job is it? More importantly, to the extent that we do not join the public fray concerning issues that we examine in the comfort of our studies, why should the"average Joe" care much about what we have to say?

I suppose this post is really about my struggle to figure out how to make philosophy relevant to more "pedestrian" concerns--something many (if not most) philosophers frequently fail to do. In some areas of philosophy--e.g., contemporary analytic metaphysics, epistemology, or the philosophy of language--the reasons for this are quite clear. But in other areas--e.g., social political theory, legal theory, and ethics--it seems less excusable. Indeed, it is telling that one area of philosophy that is often treated with derision among contemporary analytic philosophers is "applied ethics"--an area that is purportedly less rigorous or scholarly.

Comments

[Neil]

Thomas,

I'm going to comment on both your posts at once. As a defender of the use of intuitions, I don't believe that just any intuitions will do. We should seek *wide* reflective equilibrium, in which our intuitions are constrained by the empirical data, by the best science, and so on. People have a set of intuitions about punishment and deterrence, but - on the best data we have on the topic (http://www.csicop.org/si/2004-07/capital-punishment.html)

- we should set these intuitions aside. They are not informed intuitions, and simply don't count (there is a widespread tendency among people who rely on intuitions to think that only uncorrupted intuitions matter; I think that here "uncorrupted" means naive and misguided). But that doesn't mean that no intuitions count at all.

Ah, but what about the intuitions of philosophers? Are they not living counterexamples to the view that requiring that intuitions be informed will constrain them helpfully? Two points: first, it is easy to overemphasise the extent of differences among philosophers (when you're in the thick of the debates, they loom large, but take a step back and they cease to seem so important). You cite consequentialists v. deontologists. But the striking thing about contemporary consequentialism is how many epicycles and complications they have added to their theories to allow them to get the right results in the cases that drive deontology! Case by case intuitions tend to converge. Second, many philosophers do not constrain their intuitions by the empirical in the manner I have suggested. I do lots of work on the intersection of cog sci and ethics, and fellow ethicists are often very resistant. They often simply deny conclusions that are well-established in the empirical literature - eg, Nisbett and Wilson kinds of conclusions on the lack of insight we have into our own motives, or even the possibility of things like Anton's syndrome or Capgras.

As to making philosophy more relevant; well, I'm not sure what public debate is like in the US - I suspect no better than here, but I'll be glad to be shown to be wrong - but here having an informed view on something is widely regarded as disqualifying you from talking about it. The mass-media portrays academics as "out of touch with the real world". The more you have studied something, the less you are presumed to know about it. This is a problem with the public culture (I know that the UK is afflicted with this to some extent to). Philosophers can do nothing about it, at least not as philosophers. It is the result of the convergence of media interests and successful opinion manipulation with political interests. Intuitions can be manipulated for political ends - so long as no one sees the need for them to be constrained by data.

[Anthony D'Amato]

There are more "public philosophers" around these days, and getting more popular attention, than at any time in human history. They have the following characteristics. They are quick to react to current news and issues with some well-chosen words and some less-well-chosen thoughts. And they take huge risks of being wrong. (In fact they turh this risk-taking to advantage, saying to themselves that any way to get into print is OK.) The real question here is why the list of America's 100 top public philosophers does not include more than one or two of the best philosophers. The reason, I submit, that our best philosophers lack the characteristics I have just described.

[tnadelhoffer]

Professor D'Amato:
Who is on this list of "public philosophers"? I suppose Singer, Nussbaum, Appiah, Thomson, and Dworkin come to mind (and perhaps the kinds folks at Left 2 Right)--but otherwise, I would be hard pressed to come up with a list of 100 "public philosophers." Of course, this is not to suggest that there are not a number of philosophers involved in public policy issues--only that for the most part, it seems to me that most philosophers spend their time trying to get things published in academic journals that few non-specialists read. Setting professional pressures to publish aside, I was simply suggesting that since I think philosophers have something important to contribute to public debates about social-poltical-ethical issues, it is disappointing that the philosophical community does not do a better job of trying to have an impact on the broader community at large. In any event, I would be interested to hear more about the sorts of risks that you think these public philosophers run as well.

[Sujesh Thomas]

Doesn't brutally severe punishments (eg: Islamic Law) reduce crime? Capital punishment might not reduce homicide but chopping the hands off of all drug dealers could reduce the proliferation of drugs considerably. But this method definitely comes with devastating consequences for wrongfully convicted people.

[tnadelhoffer]

I was primarily interested in the American system of criminal law--where we admittedly don't chop of people's hands, but we do exectute them, sentence them to life in prison without parole, place prisoners on chain gangs, make prisoner's wear prison stripes, tolerate rampant prison rape, and deny ex-cons access to public housing, financial aid, and the right to vote. Presumably we implement these kinds of hard treatment because the public believes they are effective. I am not suggesting that we could not prevent/deter crime if we made punishments incredibly brutal (although law and econ folks would remind us that doing so would end up creating problems in the long run), it's that so long as we follow the mass publicum in believing that the main goal of the criminal law is to give bad people what they deserve, we may end up with more bad people than we otherwise would have if we took a more constructive (and scientifically minded) public health approach to crime with an emphasis on crime prevention and offender rehabilitation. But so long as the criminal law is all about desert, the resources we need to adopt public policies that might actually reduce the amount of crime in this country will continue to be appropriated by the discipline and punish crowd. My post was really an attempt to see what steps people thought should be taken to educate the public--who prefer "tough on crime" legislation under the false pretense that it makes them more safe.