Fashioning the Plain Person's View out of One's Own?

The recent issue of The Journal of Consciousness Studies is centered on an interesting paper about free will by David Hodgson (a justice of the Australian Supreme Court of NSW) entitled, "A Plain Person's Free Will." The list of commentators--which includes, e.g., J.C.C. Smart and Robert Kane--is impressive. However, it is disappointing that no one in the entire issue mentions any of the work that has been done on folk intuitions concerning free will by Eddy Nahmias, Steve Morris, Jason Turner, and myself or by Shaun Nichols (and more recently, by Nichols and Joshua Knobe). In Hodgson's defense, much of the research has yet to come out. But given that our piece on the phenomology of free will--which appeared in JCS less than six months ago--is very relevant, it would have been nice if any of the authors in this issue had at least acknowledged that perhaps we should pay more attention to what "plain people" actually believe before we place views, beliefs, and intuitions, in their mouths. In any event, the issue is full of a number of interesting discussions concerning free will and moral responsibility--so, people interested in these issues should certainly check it out. Once I have had time to wade through the whole thing, I will try to post something more about it. The abstract for Hodgson's paper is as follows:

Abstract: In my experience, plain persons (here meaning persons who are neither philosophers or cognitive scientists) tend to accept something like a libertarian position on free will, namely that free will exists and is inconsistent with determinism. That position is widely debunked by philosophers and cognitive scientists. My view at present is that something like this plain person’s position is not only defensible but likely to be closer to the truth than opposing views. To put this to the test, I have written a simple and straightforward outline of what I hope is a philosophically and scientifically respectable version of the plain person’s position on free will, and have offered it for demolition by those who say such a view is untenable. My account of free will is a robust one, explicitly inconsistent with determinism and intended to support equally robust views of personal responsibility for conduct.