"As If" Theories...

In a number of areas of philosophy one might be tempted to put forward what I am going to call an "as if" theory in an effort to respond to skeptical arguments. An “as if” theory has the following form:

Even if we have good evidence and/or arguments to the effect that humans lack some property or capacity x, it is nevertheless in our interest to continue believing and/or acting as if x is a property or capacity that we do not lack.

Take, for example, the suggestion that even if humans happen not to be "metaphysically" free--we may be better off living under the general illusion that we are. Both David Velleman's "epistemic freedom"(2001) and Saul Smilansky's "illusionism" (2000) come to mind. It is easy enough to imagine similar stories being told in other areas as well. In the wake of John Doris' attack on robust character traits via what he calls situationalism (2002), for instance, it would be easy enough for a virtue theorist with consequentialist tendencies to argue that we should continue acting as if our character traits were more robust than the empirical data suggest they actually are. Consider another possible “as if” theory--even if it turns out that harsh penalties do not deter violent crime (indeed, even if it turns out that harsher penalties make matters worse!), we are nevertheless better off as a society pretending that harsher penalties do in fact reduce the amount of violent crime.

“As if” theorists have an easy was of shielding themselves from the impact of skeptical arguments. Indeed, they can essentially grant the skeptical premises while at the same time arguing that we can avoid the potentially negative social implications of accepting these skeptical premises by simply pretending that these skeptical premises are false. Hence, even if humans are descriptively unfree or even if events are entirely determined (or entirely random for that matter) or even if many (if not most) of the springs of action are beyond (or below or above) the folds of consciousness or even if our belief in moral objectivity is false or even if there is no God (or gods), it is still to our advantage to maintain certain illusions about the contrary being the case. In this respect, “as if” theories allow us to respond to the “real” threat of skeptical concerns along roughly Humean lines—i.e., we accept the premises and conclusions of skeptical arguments at face value while in our studies. Having done so, we nevertheless eventually find ourselves once again playing backgammon with our friends and engaging in other “mundane” affairs—living as if all of those skeptical arguments were a distant bad dream. On this view, we may naturally have a preference for certain socially adaptive fictions and fantasies. Hence, another benefit of “as if” theories is that they can be coupled with evolutionary explanations for why humans prefer the illusions that we do. And they also receive some empirical support from the research into the positive societal upshots of self-aggrandizement and other forms of cognitive biases. It turns out that people are generally better off--socially speaking--if they are somewhat out of touch with the truth about their own physical and mental limitations. If so, this gives us all the more reason to consider the possibility that even if we lack some property or capacity x, perhaps we really would better off pretending that we nevertheless have x after all.

The problems with self-deception writ large notwithstanding, does anyone think that the “as if” argumentative strategy is an effective one? I haven't really thought it through myself--I am really just curious to see what others think--either about some of the examples I have discussed or others that I have overlooked.

Comments

[Tennessee Leeuwenburg]

That doesn't make any sense. I can't do this without an example, so I'm going to use free will.

Assumption : We have no free will.
Premise X : We are better off acting as though we really did have free will
Corrolary : All kinds of things in our justice system are different because we hold people to be accountable.

Okay, now let me ask you - in what sense are we really acting as though we did not have free will? By what standards are we judging "better off"?

Are we not _really_ accepting that premise X is in fact /irrelevant/, and that what is important about how we structure our justice system is that standard by which we judge "better off".

Premise X (unfree will), which SEEMED so important to the rest of our philosophy, is in fact irrelevant, because even though we know it to be true, we create our philosophy according to other measures.

[Q]

In some cases the "as if" types can actually justify their *behavior* for the following reason: certain properties *cannot*, even in theory, be determined.

Personally, I would rank "free will" as just such a property (characteristic). We humans are, currently at least, not in the position to ascertain whether or not each of us freely chooses our own future (granting that "freely choose" itself will have various definitions, the point is the same). So in the case that we cannot apprehend the value of some particular property, without resorting to fiat, *any* value of P is equally "correct". Correctness in such a scenario would simply imply "useful" (to someone).

Therefore, it would be perfectly reasonable for one to continue behaving as if they had free will even if there are those who believe that we do not, so long as one finds it useful to do so.

[John Anderson]

I don't think this free will/determinism dichotomy is particularly apt, it runs parallel to the false nature/nurture bifurcation.

How do you possibly behave "as if" you had free will or not. Is there some standard or criterion for a meaningful intersubjective self-ascription of operating under either free will or determinism?

[Anthony D'Amato]

For every "as if" behavior that turns out to be psychologically or sociologically satisfying, there is another behavior that can make you much worse off. Should a soldier on a battlefield act as if he is Superman and bullets will bounce off him if he runs across the field? Should a person in solitary confinement act as if he is living on a beautiful tropical island, or should he be looking for a way to escape from prison? If I really have free will, should I act as if I am a fatalist?

[John Anderson]

I was hoping to get some responses from the poster, but I suppose Nadelhoffer isn't interested in any discourse?

[tnadelhoffer]

Sorry Mr. Anderson, I have been out of town at a conference. I didn't get in until late last night. In any event, I did not mean to suggest that I think "as if" theories are very promising--only that I find them to be interesting. In fact, yesterday I listened to a paper on moral fictionalism--which is yet another version of an "as if" theory. As far as the "as if" free will arguments are concerned--which are the ones that Mr. Anderson suggested were problematic--the suggestion is that we are better off treating people as if they are free and as if they are fully morally responsible. It's not that I could possibly not act "as if" I am free--indeed, it is hard to imagine what acting thusly would be like--but I can certainly respond to other people's behavior as if they are free even in the event that they are not. So, for instance, if someone accidentally bumps into me--I would not ordinarily get mad at them since it is not something they meant or chose to do. On the other hand, if somene choses and tries to bump into me--they would be the target of my negative reactive attitudes. According to "as if" theories, even if none of our choices are free, we should continue holding people responsible as if they were. The same story is told by the moral fictionalists concerning our attitudes towards moral beliefs. Even if Mackie's error theory is true--i.e., even if all moral statements are false--we should still behave as if objective moral values exist.

In my original post, I was simply trying to point out that there appear to be a queer family of arguments that are all based on this notion of pretending that things were otherwise than they are. Moreover, I was curious whether others had any thoughts about this family of arguments--more specifically, I was curious whether people were familiar with any version of "as if" arguments that I had overlooked. I personally think the arguments are not only bizarre but also misguided. After all, how in the world are we supposed to go on acting as if x is true when we know/believe that x is not true? Only something like self-deception or brainwashing would seem to do the trick. Even then, it is still unclear whether we are acting as if x is the case or whether we are simply acting under the false assumption that x is the case.

And for the record, if I was not interested in discouse--I would not be running a blog that allows for comments. Patience, Mr. Anderson, patience.

[Adam Feltz]

Thomas,

I guess I don't get that last bit on only self-deception or brainwashing doing the trick. There are examples of people continuing to act as if something is true even when they know it is not true. For example, would you continue to use a folk conception of motion if you found out that it is not true, but only a rough approximation of truth? Perhaps you would continue to use it because it is more or less easy to use, it gets the job done, allows for predictions, etc... So, imagine a physicist that knows that REALLY folk physics is false, yet continues to act as if it is true because of all the practical advantages it has (maybe the true theory is enormously complicated). It is not clear to me that acting in such a manner is misguided or self-deceptive...in fact, it seems as if that is the way one should indeed act.

So, a similar argument could be made for the moral fictionalist, I guess....

[tnadelhoffer]

Adam,
I took it that John's point is that it is unclear what acting as if we are unfree would involve. I suppose a similar question could be raised concernning how one would act as if folk intuitions concerning motion were false. If it does not make much sense to talk about acting "as if" x were false, then it is unclear what sense we are to make of acting "as if" x were true. In the case of moral fictionalism--it is unclear how the notion of "as if" is doing any work. After all, according to moral fictionalism I should fully accept that there are no objective moral values and I should nevertheless continue acting as if there were--since acting thusly will bring about some positive prudential or pragmatic consequences for me or the community (it already seems like I am assuming some version of consequentialism or egoism--but leave that problem aside for now). But what work are the fictionalized moral values doing here. If I know that positive pragmatic consequences follow from my keeping my promise--even though I know there are no moral facts about being bound to keep one's promises--then why do I need to worry about the fictionalized obligations at all? Why can't I simply dispense with the false moral principles entirely and focus instead purely on hypothetical imperatives. They seem to be doing all the work after all--so, why not just ignore the whole ordeal of trying to consciosly pretend that objective moral values exist? I suppose my comments about self-deception and brainwashing were meant to highlight that fact that if something like moral fictionalism were correct--which is doubtful--it would be better to be brainwashed into believing that moral fictionalism is false. In fact, I am unsure that self-deception will do the trick given that if I deceive myself into believing that x is true--I can no longer be a fictionalist about x.

[Adam Feltz]

Well, the reason why one should mess around with the moral fiction is that it might provide protection against weakness of will or some other such benefit that would be lacking if one is not committed to a particular moral fiction. The fiction provides additional motivational force. So that is the work that the fictionalized moral values are doing.

I guess what one is to ask is which world would be better (practically)--one with no moral values at all or one with fictionalized moral values to which people are committed? In which world is one going to satisfy the hypothetical imperatives more efficiently? Presumably the one with fictionalized moral values to which people are committed. If that is the case, then even if we realize there are no objective moral facts we should continue to act "as if" there were.

Also, the moral fictionalist does not have to believe the moral fiction is true....she only has to "make-believe" the moral fiction is true. So I guess I don't see a conflict between believing X is false, and "make-believing" X is true. I mean, the English department does that ALL THE TIME!

But yea, it does seem that the hypothetical imperatives are doing A LOT of work. Certainly food for thought.

[tnadelhoffer]

On the surface at least, it appears to me that prudential considerations are doing all and not just a lot of the work. After all, prudential considerations are the reason moral fictionalists argue for pretending in the first place. In this respect, I think that prudential considerations not only drive us to adopt moral fictionalism but they also dictate which moral fictions we end up pretending are true. And given that moral fictionalism seems to be consequentialist--I think that proponents of the view must also specify whether they are advocating act moral fictionalism or rule moral fictionalism. So, for instance, am I supposed to adopt moral fictions on a case by case basis or am I supposed to adopt a system of moral fictions across the board? Either way, I still don't understand what acting "as if" moral values exist is supposed to mean or what role the fictions are supposed to play in my deliberations. Take the promise example once again. If it turns out that I have decided that in this particular case (or in general) it is in my interest to keep my promise (s), why do I need to pretend that some fictionalized moral principle of the form "thou shall keep one's promises" is true? Given that it is my interest to keep the promise (and prudential concerns are doing all of the work for the reason I mentioned above)--why make believe at all?

[tnadelhoffer]

Moreover, I don't see how the moral fictions are supposed to give us extra motivation to act or how they are to serve as safeguards against our acting against our own self-interest. After all, if I think it is in my self-interest to x--then that should be suffient for my deciding to x. And as far as I can tell, even if we introduce the possibility of weakness of will into the equation, that should not necessitate (or even motivate) my adoption of the moral fictions since these fictions are motivated primarily--if not entirely--by the very same self-interested considerations that I am tempted to act against in the first place. It is as if I am supposed to count the prudential considerations twice--first, in the form of a hypothetical impertaive, and second in the form of a fictionalized categorical imperative. But since the latter is motivated in terms of the former--indeed, the latter appears to be little more than a fictionalized redescription of the former--how is supposed to help curb the temptation? Why not just remind myself that it is in my self-interest to x rather than telling myself that it is in my self-interest to pretend that i morally ought to x?

As far as the better possible world consideration is concerned, if prudential reasons are doing all of the work anyway then I don't see why a world without moral values but with moral fictions is supposed to be any better than a world without moral values or fictions. Prudence rules the day in both cases--so, given that all other things are equal--a world with less fictions and false beliefs is better--at least epistemologically speaking--than a world with more--especially when my preferences will be equally satisfied in both worlds.

[Brendan]

Question: Why think we are better if we act "as if" people had free will?

If we are concerned with how everyday people act (and even ourselves) I think people treat each other systematically worse if we assume we all have free will.

How familiar is this story: "yes, the criminal was the product of a rough life that might have conditioned him into a life of crime, but he still had the "choice" to committ the crime or not."
Thus we need neither compassion nor caring towards the criminal, because they "chose freely" to be bad. Assume that the criminal does not have free will, and you focus on the fact that he is a product of his life experiences etc. Maybe even realize that in an important sense "it isn't his fault". This is, of course, assuming that determinism and moral responsibility (at least the sort of responsibility people seem to assume each other has if one thinks we have free will) are incompatible.

If anything, my intuition is that we are better off if we act on the assumption that others do not have free will.

[tnadelhoffer]

Brendan,
I could not agree with you more. Minimally, I think that the Strawson/Pereboom line on moral responsibility in the absence of free will is loosely correct. Moreover, I think that retributivist theories of punishment and criminal justice are based on models of free will and psychology that are hundreds of years outdated. I nevertheless think the kinds of "as if" theories I have identified are interesting--even if they are conceptually problematic.

[Adam Feltz]

Thomas,

Let me give this one last try over my morning coffee.

I don't think we want to conflate two different issues. The first is what advantage being a moral fictionalist would be. The second is deciding what moral fiction we would want to use. The first problem is entirely motivated from prudential reasons. The second is not necessarily motivated from prudential reasons. For example, one may not choose a moral fiction from purely prudential reasons. Perhaps one moral fiction is aesthetically pleasing, and that is why the person chooses one fiction over another (once he has already discovered that being a moral fictionalist is prudentially wise). So, we are not required to count prudential reasons twice, and even if we did, so what? In the first place we are motivated to be a moral fictionalist by prudential reasons. Then, in that position, we are asking what moral fiction is the best to use--perhaps we decide on prudential reasons again. So I guess I don't see the big problem with using prudential reasons first to accept that moral fictionalism is advantageous, and second, using them to choose a particular moral fiction.

In a sideways manner this response kind of answers your claim that prudential reasons are doing all the work. Certainly they are doing all the work in accepting to be a moral fictionalist, but they do not necessarily play a role in choosing the moral fiction.

Also, we want to be careful. If the fictionalist is a consequentialist (or egoist), then she is not a consequentialist in any robust or moral sense. After all, she might come to realize that error theory is correct and that there is literally nothing wrong at all. To then be labeled as a consequentialist who does think there are objectively wrong and right things would be odd. So, she must be seen as some type of consequentialist that carries no moral commitments, and I think that is OK.

Again, I am not sure how else to state the point that if there is one net benefit from being a moral fictionalist over being a moral eliminativist then we should (practically) be a moral fictionalist. So, perhaps one is not provided a benefit in the promising scenario, but perhaps one is provided a benefit in some other scenario--maybe the President would, if committed to a particular fiction, have additional reasons not to blow up schools or starve children (I am probably smuggling moral considerations in here...but you get my drift).

[tnadelhoffer]

I have yet to have my cup o morning joe, so this may not quite add up--but here it goes. Your response to my earlier comment is as follows:
"The first is what advantage being a moral fictionalist would be. The second is deciding what moral fiction we would want to use. The first problem is entirely motivated from prudential reasons. The second is not necessarily motivated from prudential reasons."
You then give an example that is supposed to show that we are not double-dipping when it comes to the prudential reasons. But you seem to have missed the point I was making about double-dipping earlier. There are to ways that we end up double-dipping: The first kind of double-dipping occurs when we deliberate about moral fictionalism. We appeal to prudential considerations at first level of deliberation when we are deciding whether to be moral fictionalist and then we appeal to them again at the second level when we are deciding which moral fictions we should adopt (here again I think the fictionalist has to spell out whether we should be act or rule fictionalists). But this is not the kind of double-dipping I was complaining about (although, even here I think there are real problems). Rather, I was trying to suggest that the moral fictions cannot help with issues of weakness of will. And as far as I can tell, these are the only instances where the moral fictions can do any work. After all, if I have already decided that doing x is prudentiallly the best thing to do--all things considered--then I should do x. The only thing that could seemingly prevent me from doing x is akrasia or weakness of will. You suggested that this is where moral fictions can be of value since they can give us additional reason to do x that might allay our temptation to act contrary to prudence. I was trying to suggest that the moral fictions can't help us here. After all, the moral fictions are just redescriptions of our prudential concerns in terms of fictionalized moral principles. So, for instance, if it is in my interest--all things considered to do x, then the moral fiction would be something like, "one ought to do x." But if the content of moral fictions is to be carved out along these lines, then I don't see how they are supposed to help me overcome my temptations. If I know I should do x (prudentially speaking), but I am tempted to do y nevertheless, what good does it do to pretend that I have a moral obligation to do x if knowing x is already the best thing for me to do is not suffient to allay the temptation in the first place?

OK, I don't feel like I am making sense. I also think that you and I can continue this debate in person (since we are lucky enough to be in the same grad program!)--which would probably be more fruitful. Plus, I would like to get the references for moral fictionalism from you. Having wet my appetite, I would like to write a criticism of the view. In any event, I have enjoyed the discussion here--even if neither my post about "as if" theories, nor the subsequent discussion thread have much to do about experimental philosophy. Of course, if we could only "prove" empirically that there are no objective moral values--whatever in the world that would look like!--then we would be forced to consider the relevant non-realist positions.

[Mike]

"As if," at least in the context of the free will debate, isn't really an argument. It is more a statement of fact. Even if we all agree we don't have free will, we'd never be able to construct a normative social theory from the idea.

Court X: We find that defendant Y was metaphysically compelled to perform action Z and therefore cannot hold Y accountable.

Y: Excellent. *walks about into the street*

Person A: I am metaphysically compelled to take revenge on person Y. *shoots Y*

Court X: We find that defendant A was metaphysically compelled to shoot person Y, and therefore cannot hold Y accountable.

Ad nauseum. Any statements about our lack of free will are useless. No practical value at all.

[Owen Bernard]

Would someone tell me where to find Vaihinger in part or whole. Lack of sufficent funds make it overly taxing at the moment. I will however seek it in the local library. Would like to stay in touch with you gentlemen, that is primarily the reason for my contact. Have not read your postings as yet but will download it and review your statements.

Kindly Yours,

Owen Bernard